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Abstract
How does greater public disclosure of arbitrage activity and informed trading affect
price efficiency? To answer this, we exploit rule amendments in U.S. securities mar-
kets, which increased the frequency of public disclosure of short positions. Higher
public disclosure can hurt the production of information and deteriorate efficiency, or
it can be beneficial by helping short-sellers diffuse their information faster. With more
frequent disclosure, information encapsulated within short interest is incorporated into
prices faster, improving price efficiency. Furthermore, we find important reductions in
short-sellers’ horizon risk, and increases in short-sales with the rule amendments.
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1 Introduction
Arbitrageurs’ activities are often viewed as essential for bringing prices in line with their
fundamental value and creating efficient markets. In the aftermath of the financial market
crisis and in particular with the Dodd-Frank Act, there has been increased attention in
understanding the role of arbitrageurs and informed traders in financial markets. Specifically,
there has been heightened interest and debate as to whether arbitrageurs and informed
traders should face more stringent public disclosure requirements.1 Regulatory policies aimed
at greater public disclosure can help reduce opaque trading; however, these policies may also
distort incentives to produce private information and to trade, and this can be harmful to
price efficiency. In this paper, we aim to contribute to this debate by analyzing the impact
of greater disclosure requirements in the shorting market.
We focus on the shorting market primarily for two reasons. First, there is ample evidence
showing that short-sellers are an example of arbitrageurs and informed traders, adept at
identifying mispriced securities and the direction of future price movements.2 Second, there
have been rule amendments in the U.S. securities market that have increased the public
disclosure requirements of short positions. This policy change provides a useful experiment
that allows us to identify the causal impact of greater public disclosure requirements imposed
on arbitrageurs and informed traders.
Specifically, how does greater publicity of short positions affect efficiency? Greater public
disclosure can potentially have both costs and benefits. A commonly held view is that
greater public disclosure of arbitrageurs’ positions can be costly as arbitrageurs may lose
their informational advantages.3 For instance, with greater public disclosure requirements,
short-sellers may end up having to disclose their positions before they fully build them
up, therefore revealing their private information prematurely. Furthermore, short-sellers
may lose their informational advantage because detailed information on positions can enable
1See, for example, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, which broadened the scope of regulatory disclosure
requirements on investor advisors, including hedge funds. Currently, hedge funds are required to disclose
with regulators; however, there is a discussion on whether they should be disclosing also to the public.
2See, for instance, Asquith, Pathak and Ritter (2005); Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2008); Desai, et al.
(2002); Fang, Huang and Karpoff (2015); Jones and Lamont (2002); Karpoff and Lou (2010).
3See, for example, recent papers by Agarwal, et al. (2013); Agarwal, et al. (2015); Christoffersen, Danesh
and Musto (2015); Easley, O’Hara and Yang (2013). Foucault, Pagano and Roell (2013) provide an excellent
survey reviewing the literature on market transparency.
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other market participants to uncover their underlying proprietary investment strategies. This
may prevent short-sellers from fully reaping the benefits of their private information, which
reduce the incentives to produce information in the first place, thereby worsening efficiency
[Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)].
A newly emerging view highlights that increased public disclosure requirements could
be beneficial by helping arbitrageurs overcome the limits to arbitrage. Arbitrageurs can be
hesitant to attack a mispricing because of horizon risk – the risk that the mispricing can
take too long to correct so that potential profits are eroded due to accumulating transaction
costs or the risk that the mispricing worsens in the short-run [Dow and Gorton (1994);
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002); Barberis and Thaler (2003)].4 For instance, in Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2002), arbitrageurs learn about an arbitrage opportunity sequentially,
and arbitrageurs may prefer to wait when they are unsure that other market participants
will also attack the mispricing. Public disclosure of short-sales positions can be helpful
as it can allow the rest of the investing public to learn from short-sellers more promptly.
Moreover, if increased public disclosure of short positions hastens the diffusion of short-
sellers’ information, then short-sellers’ horizon risk would be reduced, thereby increasing
short-selling activity and improving price efficiency.
In light of the two competing hypotheses discussed above, the effect of increased public
disclosure in the shorting market is ultimately an empirical question. We analyze this ques-
tion by studying the effects of amendments approved by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) to rules which increased the frequency of short interest reporting re-
quirements from once-a-month to twice-a-month, effective September 7, 2007. U.S. securities
exchanges publicize each stock’s total short interest, which is defined as the total outstanding
short positions in a given stock.
Prior to the amendments, investors in the U.S. received new information on short interest
only after the settlement date on the 15th of each month. In the post-amendment period,
investors receive additional new information on short interest after the settlement date at the
end of each month. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that in the post-amendment
period, additional information on short interest is publicly reported after the settlement date
at the end of each month, while in the pre-amendment period, short-sellers were not required
4Although the term “arbitrage”, strictly speaking, refers to riskless speculation, we follow the recent
literature and use the term referring to an investor’s ability to detect mispriced securities.
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to disclose their positions on these dates.
We therefore generate “placebo dates”, that is, dates where short interest would have
been publicly reported had broker-dealers been required to report the short positions at
the end of the month in the pre-amendment period. Our methodology is a differences-in-
differences test in which we test the difference in price efficiency after the end-of-month
report dates (including the placebo dates) between pre- and post-amendment periods, over
and above the differences in price efficiency after the mid-month report dates between pre-
and post-amendment periods. By taking the difference over and above the differences in
price efficiency after the mid-month report dates (which are available in both pre- and post-
amendment periods), we control for the possible market-wide changes in price efficiency from
pre- to post-amendment periods. This methodology therefore allows us to isolate the impact
of the extra short interest announcement from potential confounding effects.
Our results show that the new disclosure regime has an important impact on a stock’s
informational environment. Information encapsulated within short interest, which contains
information about future company news such as earnings announcements, is more quickly
incorporated into prices, thereby increasing price informativeness and efficiency. Our es-
timates show that, in the pre-amendment period, price efficiency on average was 7-10%
worse in the two weeks period after the placebo end-of-month report dates. However, in the
post-amendment period, this difference almost completely dissipates.
We find that the effects are stronger for stocks with higher arbitrage risk – the group
of stocks for which the benefits of higher public disclosure are expected to be particularly
important. However, for illiquid stocks which have low market depth, the effects are dimin-
ished, in some cases, the effects even reverse. This is consistent with the idea that, for stocks
which do not have enough market depth, informed traders may need more time and secrecy
in executing their trades; therefore, greater public disclosure requirements in such cases may
lead to losses in informational advantages. Furthermore, we analyse the asymmetry in the
average effects and we find that the effects of short interest disclosure are larger for stocks
with negative information, indicating that the new disclosure regime particularly helps with
the diffusion of negative information.
We complement the main findings with additional analyses to shed light on the basic
mechanism and uncover the implications of greater public disclosure on short-sellers’ horizon
risks and trading activity. If the main results are driven by the mechanism that short-sellers’
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information is diffusing faster, then short interest is expected to contain valuable informa-
tion that the investing public utilizes. To assess this, we follow Senchack and Starks (1993)
and examine the price adjustment that takes place on short interest announcement days.
While there might be alternate ways through which investors may gather information on
short-selling activity (e.g., access to proprietary datasets or informal contact with brokers),
we find that there are significant price reactions to changes in short interest on short interest
announcement days. This result highlights the significance that public disclosure of short
interest provides to investors. Furthermore, we find that price reactions on short interest an-
nouncement days are stronger in the post-amendment period, suggesting that short interest
has become more informative in more recent periods.
In addition, we investigate the possibility that there might be an overreaction to short
interest announcements. Overreactions may occur if investors believe short interest to be
more informative than what it actually is or if short-sellers use disclosures to send a false
signal to the public to manipulate stock prices [Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013)]. The
prior literature has documented limited evidence for manipulation, and the evidence which
has been found has been concentrated around seasoned equity offerings [Henry and Koski
(2010)]. If investors overreact to short interest announcements or if manipulative short-
selling is taking place, we would expect to find return reversals. However, we find that price
reactions to short-interest announcements are long lasting.
We next examine the impact of the more frequent public disclosure requirements on the
horizon risk that short-sellers face. If the improvements in price efficiency that we find
after the amendments are being driven by short-sellers’ private information diffusing faster,
we would expect a decline in their holding periods due to them cashing their positions
more quickly. Furthermore, in response to there being lower horizon risk, we would expect
them to take larger positions. In line with this, we find that a short-sellers’ holding period
(approximately 80 calendar days for a typical stock) is reduced by 10 calendar days under
the new disclosure regime, and that short sellers (as a group) also take larger positions in
the post-amendment period. We also find that there is a higher reward-to-risk following
the days after the public disclosure of the additional short interest announcement in the
post-amendment period, consistent with the idea that public disclosure of short interest
accelerates the diffusion of short-sellers’ information, allowing them to obtain returns with
lower volatility.
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Our paper contributes to the literature that studies the effects of increased publicity
of arbitrage activity and informed trading. The views in this literature are mixed. Some
authors argue that greater publicity is harmful as arbitrageurs may lose their informational
advantages [e.g., Agarwal, et al. (2013); Agarwal, et al. (2015); Christoffersen, Danesh and
Musto (2015); Easley, O’Hara and Yang (2013)]. Public disclosure could allow other investors
to infer their information, and thereby eroding the profitability of their trading strategies.
A manifestation of this in the shorting market has been documented by Jones, Reed and
Waller (2017), who study public disclosure rules in the European Union (E.U.) and find that
immediate disclosure of trader-level short positions negatively affects the amount of short-
selling and price efficiency.5 This is consistent with the view that timely public disclosure
of trader-level positions may pose a threat to proprietary investment strategies as traders
may end up having to disclose before the trade is completed. To protect their informational
advantages, informed investors may diminish their activities, which can deteriorate price
efficiency.
Contrary to the view that informed traders may not want to reveal their private infor-
mation and that public disclosure results in a loss of their informational advantage, a newly
emerging literature emphasizes the benefits that publicly disclosing private information pro-
vides [e.g., Kovbasyuk and Pagano (2015); Ljungqvist and Qian (2016); Makarov and Plantin
(2012)]. These studies argue that public disclosure can help arbitrageurs overcome the lim-
its to arbitrage arising from capital constraints and horizon risk, and subsequently, public
disclosure can improve price discovery. To date, the only evidence in support of this view is
provided by Ljungqvist and Qian (2016) who document that some arbitrageurs occasionally
share their information with the public. Our paper fits in with this strand of literature, by
showing that bi-monthly disclosure of stock-level short positions on pre-announcement dates
– which can provide time and flexibility to traders to execute their trades – can benefit the
market by improving price efficiency. Overall, our findings complement Ljungqvist and Qian
(2016). Different from voluntary information sharing, mandatory disclosures organized by
exchanges are regular and frequent, reflect the overall view in a given stock and easier to lo-
cate by investing public. With these disclosures, not only can the rest of the investing public
learn from short-sellers more promptly, but also the public disclosure can help short-sellers
5Specifically, E.U regulations require short-sellers with positions more than 0.5% of a stock’s shares
outstanding disclose their positions to the public on a next-day basis.
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mitigate their horizon risk.
Our paper sheds light on a current policy debate about on how frequently short posi-
tions should be disclosed. In a Congressional study on short-sale position and transaction
reporting required as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC (2014) acknowledged that public
real-time short position reporting “could help the market adjust to new information faster,
promoting price efficiency”. However, they also acknowledged that a more frequent short-
selling reporting regime could “facilitate copycat and order anticipation strategies that could
discourage fundamental analysis vital for price efficiency.” Considering this, our paper pro-
vides evidence that publicly disclosing stock-level short interest information on a bi-monthly
basis on pre-scheduled announcement dates strikes a balance between these opposite effects.
The dislosure regime in the U.S. mitigates the harmful effects of timely disclosure of private
information by individual traders (e.g., disclosure requirements in the E.U., as in Jones, Reed
and Waller (2017)) while bringing out the benefits that public disclosure of short interest
provides in improving price efficiency.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology; Section
3 presents the results; Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Methodology and Data Sources
2.1 Methodology
On March 6, 2007, the SEC approved amendments to revise the short interest reporting
requirements of all major securities exchanges and the National Association of Securities
Dealers (“NASD”), now known as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).
The amendments required that as of September 7, 2007, member firms of these securities
exchanges and FINRA increase the frequency of short interest reporting from once-per-month
to twice-per-month.6 Prior to the amendments, member firms were required to submit a mid-
month short interest report which was based on short positions held on the settlement date,
6The entities that were affected by these SEC approved amendments include the Boston Stock Exchange
(“BSE”), Chicago Board Options Exchange (“CBOE”), Chicago Stock Exchange (“CHX”), FINRA, In-
ternational Stock Exchange (“ISE”), NASDAQ, National Stock Exchange (“NSX”), NYSE, NYSE Arca,
American Stock Exchange (now known as NYSE MKT), and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (“PSX”).
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p019161.pdf
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namely the 15th of each month.7 If the 15th happened to fall on a weekend, the designated
settlement date was the previous business day on which the transactions settled. After the
amendments however, in addition to the mid-month short interest report, member firms are
also required to submit an end-of-month short interest report based on short positions held
on the last business day of the month on which transactions settle. Member firms have until
6:00 p.m. (E.T.) two business days after the settlement date to report their short positions.
Short interest is then aggregated on a stock-by-stock basis across all member firms and
publicly disseminated after 4:00 p.m. (E.T.), eight business days later, on pre-scheduled
announcement days.8 In this paper, we denote the date of public dissemination of short
interest as REPDATE. Since the time of public dissemination of short interest is after the
market close, the next business day after REPDATE is the date of interest in this paper,
as the next business day is when the market is able to react to this public information.
The objective of this paper is to understand whether increased public disclosure of short
interest has a causal impact on price efficiency. The SEC approved amendments provide
a particularly useful setting for identifying the impact of short interest disclosure, because
in the pre-amendment period, the short interest announcement occurred on a fixed date in
the middle of the month, and in the post-amendment period, due to the the change in the
frequency of disclosure, there is an extra short interest announcement occurring on a fixed
date at the end of the month. Our analysis therefore focuses on whether this extra short
interest disclosure affects efficiency.
Our identification strategy comes from generating “placebo dates”, that is, dates when
short interest would have been publicly reported had broker-dealers been required to report
short interest positions at the end-of-month in the pre-amendment period. We generate the
placebo dates in the pre-amendment period following the disclosure rules explained above.
Using both the actual and placebo REPDATEs, we estimate the causal impact of more
frequent reporting of short interest on price efficiency.
To estimate the effect the additional short interest disclosure has on price efficiency, we
estimate the following regression model:
7This settlement date is different than the settlement period, which is the period allotted to the parties
of a transaction to satisfy the transaction’s obligations. The settlement date, in the context of short interest
disclosure, refers to the date as of which short positions are required to be reported.
8Publication schedules for short interest dissemination are available at:
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=ShortIntPubSch.
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EFFi,t = αi + β0ei,t + β1POSTi,t + β2[e× POST ]i,t + γXi,t + εi,t (1)
EFF denotes our measures of price efficiency for stock i at time t. For the independent
variables, we include e, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations after the
end-of-month REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE the following month,
and equals 0 for observations after the mid-month REPDATE and before the end-of-month
REPDATE. The variable, POST , is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations in
the post-amendment period, that is, after September 7, 2007, and zero otherwise; and the
variable [e× POST ] is the interaction term between POST and e.
β2 is the main variable of interest in our analysis as it quantifies the impact of the
extra short interest disclosure in the post-amendment period. This coefficient captures the
differences in price efficiency after the end-of-month REPDATE between pre- and post-
amendment periods, over and above the differences in price efficiency measured after the
mid-month REPDATE between pre- and post-amendment periods. While mid-month short
interest announcements take place in both the pre- and post-amendment periods, end-of-
month short interest announcements take place only in the post-amendment period. By
calculating the effect as over and above the differences in price efficiency measured after
the mid-month short interest announcements, we control for the possible aggregate changes
in efficiency from the pre- to post-amendment period. Thus, this methodology allows us
to isolate the impact of the extra short interest announcement from potential confounding
effects arising from market-wide changes. We provide a graphical representation of our
empirical methodology in Figure 1. If greater public disclosure of short-sales negatively
affects the production of information by short-sellers, price efficiency would worsen; if it does
not negatively impact information production—instead it helps with incorporating short-
sellers’ information into prices faster—then price efficiency is expected to increase.
Our main measure of price efficiency is the cumulative abnormal returns around quarterly
firm earnings announcements [e.g., Boehmer and Wu (2013); Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012);
Kim and Verrecchia (1991)]. We calculate the absolute value of cumulative abnormal re-
turns to earnings news that arrive after the actual or placebo REPDATE. There are a
number of advantages of using this measure in our empirical setting. First, this measure of
price efficiency nicely ties in with the related literature which shows that short-sellers pos-
sess information about upcoming earnings announcements [e.g., Boehmer, Jones and Zhang
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(2015); Christophe, Ferri and Angel (2004); Christophe, Ferri and Hsieh (2010); Francis,
Venkatachalam and Zhang (2005)]. For instance, short interest announcements can provide
an informed signal to investors from which they can learn about a firm’s news more readily.
Second, earnings announcements allow us to analyze the asymmetric effects of positive versus
negative information—a feature that cannot be easily captured by other measures of price
efficiency. If, with the new regulatory regime, prices become more (less) informative, then
market surprises to earnings announcements thereafter are expected to be smaller (larger).
We use earnings announcements returns as the main measure, but later in Section 3.2.5, we
broaden the analysis to alternative measures of price efficiency.
In robustness tests, we include a vector of control variables, Xit, which the previous
literature shows to be related to our measures of price efficiency. In addition, we include
year, month and day-of-week time fixed effects as well as industry and stock fixed effects.9
Standard errors are double-clustered by stock and day.
2.2 Data Sources and Variables
The sample consists of common stocks (with share codes of 10 or 11) from the CRSP-
Compustat universe. Market data is obtained from the CRSP Daily Files, and financial-
statement related information is obtained from the Compustat Merged Security Monthly File.
Analyses that are based on earnings announcements use additional data from I/B/E/S. When
the earnings announcement date is included in both Compustat and I/B/E/S databases and
the I/B/E/S date is different from the Compustat date, we use the earlier date as the date of
the earnings announcement date.10 Earnings announcements released after 4:00 p.m. (E.T.)
are moved to the next trading day. Short-term and long-term market reactions to earnings
announcements are measured using different windows, namely, [0,1] and [2,61] days after the
earnings announcement.11 For the long-term market reaction, we focus primarily on 60 days
9We use the Fama-French 10 industry classification from Kenneth French’s website, available at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_10_ind_port.html.
10DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) report that the earlier of the two dates is almost always the correct
announcement date in the post-1994 period.
11We calculate abnormal returns to earnings announcements both in a short-horizon as well as a longer-
horizon window. Changes in the degree of price informativeness can impact both the immediate abnormal
returns as well as abnormal returns going forward. For instance, in a hypothetical extreme case, whereby
price fully reflects the upcoming earnings news, there would be no market surprise when the news arrives
and also no post-announcement drift after the arrival of the news.
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for the post-announcement window as the literature commonly follows Bernard and Thomas
(1989), who report that most of the post-earnings announcement drift occurs during the first
60 days. We obtain similar results when we use 75 days as the post-announcement window.
We measure market reactions to earnings announcements by the absolute value of cumu-
lative abnormal returns to earnings announcements. When defining the cumulative abnormal
returns, we use two methods. First, similar to Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009), we com-
pute the difference between the buy-and-hold return of the firm and that of a size and
book-to-market (B/M) matched portfolio,12 and then take the absolute value:
CAR[m,n]i,q =
∣∣∣∣∣
[
t+n∏
k=t
(1 +Ri,k)− 1
]
−
[
t+n∏
k=t
(1 +Rp,k)− 1
]∣∣∣∣∣ (2)
Ri,k is the return of stock i on day k, and Rp,k is the return of the matching size and
B/M portfolio on day k, where t is the earnings announcement date of quarter q’s earnings.
Second, similar to DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), we compute the difference between the buy-
and-hold return of the firm and beta multiplied by the buy-and-hold return of the market,
and then take the absolute value:
CAR[m,n]i,q =
∣∣∣∣∣
[
t+n∏
k=t
(1 +Ri,k)− 1
]
− βˆi,q
[
t+n∏
k=t
(1 +Rm,k)− 1
]∣∣∣∣∣ (3)
Once again, Ri,k is the return of stock i on day k, and Rm,k is the return on the market on day
k, and βˆi,q for stock i in quarter q is obtained from the regression Ri,u = αi,q+βi,qRm,u+ εi,u
for the days u ∈ [t− 300, t− 46], where t is the date of the earnings announcement. We use
the absolute value of cumulative abnormal returns since we are interested in examining the
change in the size of earnings reactions after short interest announcements. Later in Section
3.2.4, we analyze whether this depends on the earnings announcement being a negative or a
positive surprise.
As the objective of our paper is to analyze the impact of the new regulatory regime,
we divide the sample into two sub-periods around the rule amendments. The first part
12Each stock is matched with one of 25 size and B/M portfolios at the end of June each year based
on the market capitalization at the end of June and B/M, book equity of the last fiscal year end in
the prior calendar year divided by the market value of equity at the end of December of the prior year.
The daily returns of size and B/M portfolios are obtained from Kenneth French’s website, available at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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of our sample runs from January 1, 2003 to September 6, 2007, which we refer to as the
“pre-amendment period”, and the second part of our sample runs from September 7, 2007
to December 31, 2012, which we refer to as the “post-amendment period”. In deciding our
sample period, we aim to choose a period that is long enough to provide empirical power for
our tests (since firms announce their earnings news quarterly, we have only four observations
per firm in each year), but also narrow enough to capture the effect due to regulatory
amendments. Later in the paper, we show that our results are robust to alternative sample
periods.
Shortly after the SEC approved amendments, stock markets experienced dramatic turbu-
lence and the SEC implemented temporary prohibitions and bans to short selling. Although
our methodology would take into account the impact of market-wide changes between the
pre- and post-amendment periods, we exclude the 2008 calendar year and financial stocks
to prevent some extreme observations during this period from affecting our findings. Ad-
ditionally, following the literature, we exclude stocks with price less than $1 (before split-
adjustment) to minimize the possibility of data errors.
In robustness tests, we control for numerous variables which previous literature shows to
be related to earnings reactions [e.g., Bernard and Thomas (1989); Chambers and Penman
(1984); DellaVigna and Pollet (2009); Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009)]. We control for the
number of analysts following the stock (NUMEST ); earnings persistence (EARNINGS_PERSIST );
earnings volatility (EARNINGS_V OL); forecast error (FE), the number of earnings an-
nouncements on the given day of a firm’s own earnings announcement (NUMANN); and
institutional ownership (IO). Definitions of these variables can be found in Appendix A.
As we expect our results on the market reactions to earnings announcements to also af-
fect trading outcomes, we construct additional measures of the dependent variable, namely
stock turnover (TURNOV ER); stock price volatility (V OLATILITY ); and bid-ask spread
(SPREAD). Different from TURNOV ER and V OLATILITY , we measure SPREAD
prior to the earnings announcements since trading by informed investors, and thus asym-
metric information, intensifies before earnings announcements. Definitions of these variables
are available in Appendix A.
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3 Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1, we present descriptive statistics for our main analysis. Panel A presents the
descriptive statistics for the sample of firms where e = 0, and Panel B presents the descriptive
statistics for the sample of firms where e = 1. As our identification strategy hinges on the
timing of the earnings announcement relative to the end-of-month REPDATE, we report
the descriptive statistics for e = 0 and e = 1 separately and draw comparisons between
them. We examine firm characteristics that the previous literature shows to be related to
the size of earnings reactions.
The main result from Table 1 is that there are no meaningful differences between firms
that issue their quarterly earnings announcements after the mid-month or end-of-month
short interest announcement. For instance, the number of analysts giving EPS forecasts,
the analyst forecast error, earnings persistence and earnings volatility are almost identical
between the two samples. While some variables, such as institutional ownership as a fraction
of shares outstanding and the number of concurrent earnings announcements, are slightly
higher when e = 1 (60.57% and 4.67 respectively) than when e = 0 (56.93% and 4.09
respectively), the differences appear to be small. The fact that the difference in magnitude
in the means and medians between these two samples appears to be small indicates that
our results cannot be explained merely by the characteristics of the two samples; however,
in robustness tests, we control for these variables in our empirical specifications. Overall,
findings in Table 1 support our empirical design.
3.2 Main Results
3.2.1 Short-Term Price Reactions to Earnings Announcements
As discussed earlier, our identification hinges on the fact that in the post-amendment period,
short interest is publicly disseminated after the end of each month in addition to the middle of
each month. Therefore, if more frequent disclosure of short interest impacts price efficiency,
these differences should be noticeable around the end-of-month REPDATE.
In Table 2, we estimate (1) using the absolute value of the cumulative abnormal returns in
[0,1] day period around earnings announcements. Panel A shows the results when cumulative
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abnormal returns are estimated as in DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), and Panel B shows the
results when cumulative abnormal returns are estimated as in Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh
(2009). Column 1 in both panels show the baseline results. We note that POST is significant
and positive, perhaps due to increased aggregate uncertainty in the post-amendment period.
Importantly, our main variable of interest, [e× POST ], is significantly negative. What this
indicates is that with more frequent reporting of short interest, the market is less surprised
after end-of-month short interest announcements in the post-amendment period. This is
consistent with short interest announcements serving as an informative signal for investors,
a signal that helps them learn about future news related to company earnings more readily.
The coefficient on [e×POST ] in Panel A shows that in the post-amendment period, the
market reaction to earnings announcements that occur after the end-of-month REPDATE
is 30 bps lower than after the mid-month REPDATE in the pre-amendment period. Since
the mean and median reaction to earnings announcements (in absolute value) in our sample
are 4.3% and 2.8%, respectively, the economic magnitude of a 30 bps reduction translates
to an approximately 7% reduction in mean and 11% reduction in median market reaction to
earnings announcements.
Furthermore, we find that in the pre-amendment period, the market reaction to earning
announcements that take place after the placebo REPDATE is 32 bps higher than market
reactions that take place after the mid-month REPDATE. This result provides further
support for the hypothesis that the public dissemination of short interest allows investors to
learn about firm fundamentals more readily. Thus, lack of information on short interest at
the end of the month in pre-amendment period leads to larger market reactions to earnings
announcements that come afterwards. Altogether, the estimates reported in Table 2 imply
that the differences in efficiency measured after the mid-month REPDATE and the effi-
ciency measured after the end-of-month REPDATE the following month dissipate in the
post-amendment period. Since, in the post-amendment period, investors receive information
about short interest in both the middle of the month and at the end of the month, there is
no longer a difference between the periods that come after a mid-month or an end-of-month
REPDATE. This a pattern that we find throughout our tests. This finding strengthens
the conclusion that it is the change in the reporting frequency of short interest that drives
our results. An alternative hypothesis should be able to explain not only the estimates on
[e × POST ], but also the estimates on e. This can be difficult because short interest pub-
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lic disclosure announcement dates, to the best of our knowledge, are specific to the short
interest reporting regime.13
In column 2 of both panels, we include several stock characteristics which are shown to be
related to reactions to earnings announcements such asNUMEST , IO, FE,EARNINGS_PERSIST ,
EARNINGS_V OL, and industry and time fixed effects. Consistent with the literature, we
find that these characteristics are related to reactions to earnings announcements; however,
the inclusion of these variables in our empirical specification does not change our conclusions.
This is consistent with the descriptive statistics we provide in Table 1 showing that there
are no meaningful differences in stock characteristics for firms which have their earnings an-
nouncement at different times within the month. In column 3 of both panels, we control for
NUMANN , as it has been shown that the total number of earnings announcements in a day
has a negative impact on reactions to earnings announcements [Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh
(2009)]. Consistent with Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009), the coefficient on NUMANN is
significant and negative, yet our results remain robust. Finally, in column 4 of both panels,
we follow Michaely, Rubin and Vedrashko (2012) and include firm fixed effects to control
for the potential impact of unobserved stock characteristics on market reactions to earnings
news and find that our results still remain robust. Results in Table 2 indicate that the
coefficient on [e× POST ] is negative and statistically significant across all specifications.
3.2.2 Other Short-Term Effects Around Earnings Announcements
If more frequent disclosure of short interest improves the price efficiency of stock prices,
we would expect that gains to price efficiency are also manifested through trading activity.
Furthermore, we would also expect that the end-of-month short interest disclosure reveals
additional private information by short-sellers, reducing asymmetric information. To that
effect, we estimate the regression model in (1); however instead, we use TURNOV ER,
V OLATILITY and SPREAD as the dependent variables.
13For instance, on July 6, 2007, the SEC removed the uptick rule in the remaining NYSE, Amex and
NASDAQ stocks that had not been included in the original Reg SHO pilot in 2005. This could be viewed
as relaxing short-sale constraints, thereby improving price efficiency. If the removal of the uptick rule were
to explain our results, one would need to be able to explain why efficiency was worse after the (placebo)
end-of-month short interest announcements in the pre-amendment period. It is not clear why this would be
the case. Nonetheless, we reproduce our main results excluding the periods 2003 and 2004 as well as the
stocks which experienced a change in the uptick test rule on July 2007. Table IA.4 shows that the results
remain similar.
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In Table 3, we start by using TURNOV ER as the dependent variable. We include the
control variables discussed above, and time, industry and stock fixed effects. The coeffi-
cient on [e× POST ] is negative (-0.0011) and statistically significant, implying that in the
post-amendment period, there is on average a 7.2% reduction in turnover around earnings
announcements that occur after the end-of-month REPDATE. Similarly, in Column 2, we
use V OLATILITY as the dependent variable and find that the coefficient on [e × POST ]
is negative (-0.0209) and statistically significant, suggesting that volatility around earnings
announcements after the end-of-month REPDATE is significantly lower (approximately
6.8%, on average) than in the pre-amendment period. Together, these results are in congru-
ence with the pricing results presented in Table 2; that is, in the post-amendment period,
earnings announcements occurring after the end-of-month short interest announcements are
less of a surprise to the market, and thus, the lower price reactions are complemented by
lower trading activity (turnover) and lower volatility.
We also expect the regulatory amendments to impact information asymmetry and liq-
uidity. Revelation of short-sellers’ private information through increased public disclosure
of short interest may reduce market-makers’ risks arising from asymmetric information, and
therefore lower the bid-ask spread [e.g., Copeland and Galai (1983); Glosten and Milgrom
(1985)]. We measure bid-ask spreads prior to the earnings announcements because earnings
announcements are pre-scheduled announcements, thus market makers can anticipate an
increase in informed trading activity before the earnings announcements. The results show
that the coefficient on [e×POST ] is negative (-0.0126) and statistically significant, indicating
that in the post-amendment period, there is on average a 7% reduction in the pre-earnings
announcement bid-ask spread. Intuitively, these results are indicative that more frequent
disclosure of short interest expedites the incorporation of short-sellers’ private information
into the public domain. The market learns about their private information and this reduces
asymmetric information between investors prior to firms’ earnings announcements. These
results complement the findings in Table 2.
3.2.3 Long-Term Price Reactions to Earnings Announcements
As returns tend to be positive after positive earnings surprises and negative after negative
earnings surprises, this suggests that post-earnings announcement drift may be a sign of
market inefficiency, as investors fail to recognize information embedded in earnings surprises
16
and therefore prices seemingly do not fully incorporate earnings related information at the
time of the announcement [Bernard and Thomas (1989)]. We examine whether long-term
price reactions after earnings announcements are also mitigated once there is more frequent
disclosure of short interest. Results so far indicate that market participants learn from
short interest announcements about upcoming earnings announcements, and therefore price
informativeness increases. As we discuss in Section 2.2, the increase in price informativeness
is expected to affect not only the immediate price reactions to earnings announcements, but
also price reactions in the period afterwards.
In Table 4, we estimate (1) using the [2,61] day period after earnings announcements as
the measure of cumulative abnormal returns. Panel A of Table 4 shows that when cumulative
returns are calculated as in DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). Across all specifications, the
coefficient estimates on [e×POST ] are negative and statistically significant, ranging between
-66 bps and -83 bps. Panel B of Table 4 shows that when cumulative abnormal returns are
calculated as in Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009), across all specifications, the coefficients
on [e × POST ] are negative and statistically significant, ranging between -60 bps and -75
bps. Overall, these estimates from both panels suggest that in the post-amendment period,
there is on average a 7-9% reduction in long-term price reactions to earnings announcements
after the end-of-month REPDATE. These results are in line with results from Table 2-3.
3.2.4 Cross-Sectional Differences
In this section, we analyze whether there are cross-sectional differences in the impact of new
disclosure regime. To this end, we start by examining the role of arbitrage risk, which can be
an important limitation to arbitrage activity. We measure arbitrage risk in two ways. First,
we follow Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2018), and we calculate FeeRisk, which is
defined as the standard deviation in a stock’s loan fees in a given month. Engelberg, Reed,
and Ringgenberg (2018) provide evidence that changes in loan fees can pose important
risks to short-sellers, especially if their holding periods are long. In addition, following
Ljungqvist and Qian (2016) and Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2015), we use idiosyncratic
volatility (IV OL) as a measure of risky arbitrage. High idiosyncratic volatility can cause
adverse price movements and therefore lead to early liquidation risks. If the new disclosure
regime helps short-sellers overcome the limits to arbitrage, then we would expect the effects
to be more pronounced for stocks with higher arbitrage risks.
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Second, we use proxies which capture a stock’s market depth, thus the ease of trade
execution. For stocks which do not have enough market depth, informed traders may need
more time and secrecy in executing their trades. More frequent public disclosure can be
costly in such stocks, thus we may see the main results reversing for stocks with low market
depth. Intuitively, for stocks with high noise trading activity, informed traders may be
able to execute their trades faster without having a large price impact. Although we don’t
have a direct measure of noise trading activity, we aim to capture this notion by introducing
RetailT rading, which is a dummy equals to 1 when the stock’s institutional ownership is low
and the stock has a high trading activity. In the same vein, we follow the related literature
and use Amihud’s ILLIQ, which is designed to capture market depth [e.g, Foucault, Pagano
and Roell (2013)].
Finally, we test whether the main results depend on whether the earnings announcement
was a negative or a positive surprise. If more frequent disclosure of short interest helps
investors promptly learn about short-sellers’ private information (which contains negative
information), we would expect the results to be more pronounced for stocks with negative
information. To test this idea, we define NegNew, which is a dummy variable that equals 1
if the firm’s earnings announcement is negative.
For each of these variables, we introduce triple-differences and we include all lower-level
interaction terms in the empirical specification. Results are reported in Table 5. Columns
1 and 2 show the results for FeeRisk and IV OL; Columns 3 and 4 show the results for
RetailT rading and ILLIQ; and Column 5 shows the results forNegNew. The main variable
of interest in this section is the coefficient on triple interaction terms.
Table 5 reveals useful findings. First of all, Columns 1 and 2 consistently show that results
are indeed more pronounced for stocks with higher arbitrage risk. Moreover, in Columns
3 and 4, we find that market depth plays an important role. For instance, results show
that, stocks which have low market depth captured by high ILLIQ, experience a worsening
in price informativeness after the rule amendments. This indicates that, for stocks with
lower market depth, costs of new disclosure regime outweigh the benefits. Finally, Column
5 shows that the triple interaction term with NegNew is negative and significant, showing
that greater disclosure of short interest particularly helps with the diffusion of negative
information which tends to travel slowly [Cohen, Lou and Malloy (2014); Hong, Lim and
Stein (2000)].
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3.2.5 Alternative Measures of Price Efficiency
In this section, we test whether our main results from Table 2-4 hold when we use alternative
measures of price efficiency which do not depend on earnings announcements. Our first
approach is to follow Hou and Moskowitz (2005) and estimate price delay—a measure of the
delay in which stock prices respond to market information. The greater price delay is, the
more the stock’s return variation can be captured by lagged market returns, indicating less
price efficiency.
We adopt a variant of Hou and Moskowitz’s (2005) measures because Hou and Moskowitz
(2005) estimate price delay only once per year using the time series of one year of lagged
returns. We estimate Hou and Moskowitz’s (2005) measures of price delay using the cross-
section of all stocks between two consecutive REPDATEs (including placebo report dates).
Therefore, there is a single price delay corresponding to each REPDATE. Our first price
delay measure is DELAY 1, which considers the impact of lagged market returns predicting
future stock returns. The second measure, DELAY 1_NEG, is similar to the first one, but
it differs from it by using only negative lagged market returns for the estimation. The third
measure, DELAY 3, distinguishes between shorter and longer lags of market returns and
accounts for the precision of estimates on the coefficient of lagged market returns. Further
details regarding the calculation of these variables can be found in Appendix A.
We estimate our main regression equation usingDELAY 1,DELAY 1_NEG, andDELAY 3
as our measures of information efficiency. Because our delay measures are estimated using
the cross-section of all stocks between REPDATEs—as opposed to being estimated for
each stock individually—stock specific control variables are no longer included in these re-
gressions. Table 6 shows that results are consistent with previous findings. Coefficients on
[e× POST ] are significantly negative regardless of the delay measure used, which indicates
improvements in price efficiency.
Furthermore, we calculate high frequency measures of price efficiency based on intraday
trades and quotes from TAQ.14 Our first high frequency measure of price efficiency is based
on studies such as Boehmer and Kelley (2009) which use variance ratios to test whether prices
follow a random walk. A random walk implies that the ratio of longer-term to shorter-term
return variances, scaled by unit of time should be equal to one. We construct our measure of
14For further details regarding the processing of TAQ data and constructing of the high frequency measures
of price efficiency, please refer to Appendix B.
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variance ratio, defined as V ARRATIO =
∣∣∣1− var(30min)30var(1min) ∣∣∣, where var(30min) is the variance
of overlapping 30-minute intraday returns and var(1min) is the variance of overlapping
1-minute intraday returns.According to this measure, smaller V ARRATIO indicates that
stock prices are more informationally efficient. Table 7 report results using V ARRATIO as
the measure of price efficiency. Column 1 shows results with no control variables; Column
2 includes control variables that might be associated with high frequency measures of price
efficiency. We find that the coefficient on [e×POST ] in both specifications are significantly
negative.
Our second high frequency measure of price efficiency is based on calculating pricing
errors [e.g., Boehmer and Kelley (2009); Boehmer and Wu (2013); Hasbrouck (1993)]. We
decompose log intraday transaction prices from TAQ into an efficient price, random walk
component (mt) and a stationary component, the pricing error (st). We then construct
the scaled pricing error, PE = σ(s)
σ(p)
, where σ(s) is the standard deviation of the pricing
error, which is assumed to follow a zero-mean, covariance-stationary process, and σ(p) is
the standard deviation of intraday transaction prices, used to control for cross-sectional
differences in price volatility. According to this measure, small PE indicates that stock
prices are more informationally efficient. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 show results using
PE as the measures of price efficiency. Consistent with previous findings, we find that the
coefficients on [e× POST ] are significantly negative.
3.2.6 Summary
Findings in Section 3.2 show that the new reporting regime improves price efficiency. This
finding is contrary to the view that higher public disclosure requirements would be harmful to
efficiency as they hurt the production of information, but it is consistent with studies which
emphasize the benefits that can come with publicizing private information [e.g., Kovbasyuk
and Pagano (2015); Ljungqvist and Qian (2016); Makarov and Plantin (2012)]. To date
the only empirical evidence in support of the latter view is provided by Ljungqvist and
Qian (2016) who document that arbitrageurs occasionally share their information with the
public. While Ljungqvist and Qian (2016) analyse voluntary information sharing, we study
mandatory public disclosures of positions, which are different than voluntary information
sharing in a number of ways. Voluntary information sharing are occasional, reflect only an
individual investor’s opinion and can be more costly to access as investors have to search
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through each trader’s website. Mandatory disclosures organized by exchanges, on the other
hand, are regular and frequent, reflect the overall view in a given stock and easier to locate
by investing public. Overall, our findings complement the main message of Ljungqvist and
Qian (2016).
3.3 Robustness Analyses
3.3.1 Alternative Sample Periods
As discussed in Section 2, our sample period runs from January 2003 to December 2012,
excluding 2008. In Panel A of Table IA.1 (reported in the Internet Appendix), we re-estimate
our results from Tables 2-4 using an equal 48-month window in the pre- and post-amendment
period, excluding all observations from 2008. This ensures that the pre- and post-amendment
periods are of equal distance from the date of the regulatory amendments. In Panel B, we
re-estimate our results using 48 months in the pre-amendment period and 60 months in
the post amendment period, excluding all observations from 2008. This ensures that there
are an equal number of REPDATEs in the pre- and post-amendment periods. These two
empirical choices are complementary and we analyze whether our results are sensitive to
using alternative sample periods. We find that in both panels, the coefficient on [e×POST ]
across all specifications is negative, statistically significant and of comparable magnitude to
results presented in Tables 2-4. This robustness check provides support that the choice of
sample period does not drive our results.
3.3.2 Timing of Earnings Announcements
The underlying idea behind our tests which use earnings reactions is that firms that re-
lease their earnings announcements after the mid-month REPDATE are not meaning-
fully different from firms that release their earnings announcements after the end-of-month
REPDATE. In support of this, in Table 1, we show that the timing of earnings announce-
ments relative to the REPDATE is not associated with significant differences in terms of
firm characteristics. In Tables 2-5, we control for these firms characteristics in our regres-
sions, and in further tests, we also include stock fixed effects to control for unobservable firm
characteristics. Our results remain robust after including these controls.
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To further assess whether the timing of a firm’s earnings announcements affects our
results, we re-estimate Tables 2-4 using a sub-sample of firms which have propensity to
release their earnings announcements in the same time-frame relative to the end-of month
REPDATE, in both the pre- and post-amendment periods. We determine propensity by
calculating the average value of e(e¯) for each firm in the pre- and post-amendment period. If
e¯ > 0.5 (e¯ < 0.5) for a given firm in both the pre- and post- amendment period, we classify
the firm as having a tendency to release earnings in the same timeframe relative to the
end-of month REPDATE, in both the pre- and post-amendment periods. The sub-sample
constructed in this way contains about 65% of the firms included in the original sample.
Results are reported in Table IA.2 of the Internet Appendix. We observe that the coefficient
on [e×POST ] across all specifications is negative, statistically significant and of comparable
magnitude to the results presented in Tables 2-4. This robustness check highlights that the
timing of earnings announcements does not drive our results.
3.3.3 Alternative Ways to Acquire Information on Short Selling
There might be alternative ways through which investors can access some information on
short-selling. For instance, Markit is a private data vendor that provides data on securities
lending market. Investors who are subscribed to Markit receive regular updates on total
short positions taken by Markit’s subscribers.15 The availability of Markit data may at first
appear as a concern for the empirical design, however, for a number of reasons, we believe
that the availability of Markit data is not central to the interpretation of our findings. First,
Markit data has been available (either at the daily or weekly frequency) throughout our
sample period including the pre-amendment period. Therefore, it is unlikely to explain our
results; if anything, it would go against finding significant differences between the pre- and
post-amendment periods. Second, due to its high subscription fees, Markit data is unlikely
to be available to a large number of investors.
Therefore, we believe that the availability of Markit data is unlikely to be a major concern.
Nevertheless, we conduct robustness tests to assess the potential role of Markit data. To this
end, we exploit the dates when Markit changed its reporting frequency of its short-sales data.
Markit has provided data on total short positions since June 2002. Markit initially released
15According to the information provided by Markit, brokers and hedge funds are their typical clients.
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monthly data on total short positions on its covered universe between June 2002 and July
2004. It then released weekly data between August 2004 and June 2006, and finally released
daily data from July 2006 through to present. Note that all of these changes occured in the
pre-amendment period.
We analyze whether this more frequent disclosure of Markit data had any effect on
the price efficiency. Specifically, we conduct before-and-after analyses using the three ex-
periements took place on: (i) June 2002, where Markit first started providing monthly data;
(ii) August 2004, when reporting frequency of Markit data increased from monthly to weekly;
and (iii) July 2006, when the reporting frequency increased from weekly to daily. We in-
troduce dummy variables (MONTHLY , WEEKLY , and DAILY ) to capture the effects
before and after each change. Results are reported in Table IA.3 of the Internet Appendix.
With the exception of the first experiment (for which there is some, albeit weak, evidence
suggesting increases in price efficiency), we find that change in the reporting frequency of
Markit data does not have an impact on price efficiency. This is perhaps not surprising for
the reasons discussed above.
In addition to Markit data, commencing from the fourth quarter of 2009, FINRA started
publishing aggregate short volume data by security on each day. As opposed to short interest,
which is calculated as the total outstanding open positions at the end of each day, short
volume is the amount of short-sale trades executed within a trading day. While part of short
volume is due to intra-day short selling for market-making purposes and by high-frequency
traders, short interest is likely to capture negative information relevant over longer horizons.
Importantly, short volume data is released to public with a one-month delay, therefore it
does not provide timely information.
If there are alternative ways through which the wider investing public can gather infor-
mation on short-selling activity (e.g., access to proprietary datasets, informal contacts with
brokers or alike), then short interest announcements by exchanges would not contain new
information, and therefore we would not observe significant market reactions to changes in
short interest on short interest announcement days. We analyze this in the next section.
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3.4 Market Reactions to Short Interest Announcements
So far we have shown that increasing the frequency of short interest disclosure improves
price informativeness and thus efficiency. If this result is driven by the mechanism that
wider investing public learn about short sellers’ private information more promptly with
greater disclosure, then it should be that short interest contain new information and market
participants watch short interest announcements to improve their inferences. This would
imply significant price adjustments on short interest announcement days. If market partici-
pants already have access to short-selling information from other potential sources, we then
would not find any market reactions to short interest announcements.
To examine this, we calculate the price reactions to ∆SHORT , which is the change in
short interest between two successive short interest announcements, scaled by stock’s shares
outstanding at the end of the month. We use changes in short interest, as opposed to the
levels of short interest, as we expect the market to react to new information. Using data
on short interest from Compustat, we form 10 portfolios based on changes in short interest
on each announcement date.16 For consistency, our sample period is from January 2003 to
December 2012 (excluding 2008); and, the universe of stocks is the merged CRSP-Compustat
universe. As short-selling conveys pessimistic information, we expect a negative relationship
between changes in short interest and price adjustments.
Previously, Senchack and Starks (1993) have studied market reactions to short interest
announcements from 1980 to 1986. We re-conduct this analysis during our sample period
because market reactions to short interest announcements might be different in more recent
periods, for instance, due to the availability of more information on short-selling activity.
Furthermore, we can overcome the data limitations experienced by Senchack and Starks
(1993)—while Senchack and Starks (1993) were able to hand collect data on short interest
only for a group of stocks, we can observe this for all firms on listed exchanges.
Panel A of Table 8 reports the average 2-day announcement returns adjusted for size
and book-to-market ratio, and alphas estimated from a 3-factor and a 4-factor model by
for portfolios formed on ∆SHORT . Using all three measures, we find a significant negative
relationship between changes in short interest and announcement returns. For instance, a
strategy that buys the stocks in the bottom decile portfolio and sells the stocks in top decile
16Compustat consolidates data from the exhanges’ websites on short interest from the public announce-
ments, therefore it is precisely the information disseminated to public.
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portfolio earns an average daily 4-factor alpha of 15 bps (approximately a monthly alpha of
300 bps) and is significant at the 1% level. As short interest conveys pessimistic information,
price reactions (in absolute terms) are much larger for the top decile portfolio than for the
bottom decile portfolio.17
Results in Panel A show the average price effects during our sample period. We conduct
a subsample analysis to see whether market reactions to short interest announcements have
been different in the pre- and post-amendment periods. Although the average price effects
is significant during our sample period, it might be that this is mostly driven by the pre-
amendment period if alternative ways to acquire information on short-sales has become more
widely available in the post-amendment period. We assess this possibility and find that this
is not the case. Panel B of Table 8 reports the average 2-day short interest announcement
returns before and after the rule amendments. Market reactions to short interest announce-
ments are, if anything, significantly larger (about doubled) in the post-amendment period.
Overall, findings in Panels A and B show that the availability of alternative ways to ac-
cess information on short-selling does not undermine the short interest announcements by
exchanges. This result may not be too surprising considering the fact that the alternative
ways are costly to access.
To visualize the price adjustments taking place, Figure 2 plots the cumulative 4-factor
alphas for the top and bottom decile portfolios starting from 7 trading days prior to the
short-interest announcements until 10 trading days after the short-interest announcements.
The patterns Figure 2 show that there is no noticeable pattern in alphas before the short
interest announcements, suggesting that there is no significant price effects from potential
front-running prior to the announcements. We also confirm this in portfolio tests reported
in Panel C of Table 8.
Finally, we check for the possibility that there might be an overreaction to short inter-
est announcements. An overreaction to short interest may occur if investors believe that
short interest is more informative than it actually is or if abusive short-sellers use public
announcements to manipulate other market participants’ beliefs. The prior literature has
documented limited evidence for manipulation, and the evidence which has been found has
17These results are both qualitative and quantitatively similar to the results from related studies. For
instance, Kelley and Tetlock (2016) reports that a high-minus-low portfolio constructed on quintiles of
lagged retail daily short-selling activity lead to a daily alpha of 7 bps over the next day.
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been concentrated around seasoned equity offerings [Henry and Koski (2010)]. If investors
overreact to short interest announcements or if manipulative short-selling is taking place,
we would expect to find return reversals. To detect a possible reversal effect, in Figure 3,
we show the cumulative 4-alphas over the next 60 trading days after the REPDATE for
the top decile portfolio. Furthermore, we repeat this analysis for the small stocks, which
might be more susceptible to market manipulation as they don’t have enough liquidity, and
growth stocks, which tend to have high short-selling activitiy. The plot shows the long-term
patterns not only for the full sample, but also for the subsamples of small and growth stocks.
We do not find any reversals in any of our samples, indicating that the price reactions due
to short interest announcements are long-lasting.
3.5 Short-Sellers’ Holding Periods, Reward-to-Risk Ratios and Activity
Short-sellers may face important horizon risks—the risk that a mispricing can take too long
to correct so that potential profits are eroded by accumulating transaction costs or the risk
that the mispricing worsens in the short-run due to noise trading activity. For instance, short-
sellers need to maintain margin requirements, thus large adverse price movements can lead
to early liquidation risk; moreover, short-sellers need to pay fees to keep their positions open.
As argued by the seminal papers of Dow and Gorton (1994) and Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2002), horizon risk can discourage arbitrage activity. If, with the new disclosure regime,
short-sellers’ information is more quickly incorporated into prices, then we would expect: (i)
a decline in the holding periods of short sellers, and (ii) a reduction in the risk of experiencing
adverse price movements. Furthermore, if limits to arbitrage arising from horizon risk are
mitigated with the new disclosure rules, then we also expect to see an increase in the amount
of short-selling. In this section, we examine these hypotheses.
We start by measuring the holding periods of short-sellers’ positions using data from
Markit. Markit reports the weighted average number of (calendar) days that transactions
have been open. We use data from July 3, 2006 onwards—the date in which Markit com-
menced reporting data at a daily frequency. We take the average of all loans for a stock
between two consecutive short interest announcement days and run the following regression:
LOANLENGTHi,t+1 = αi + θ0ei,t + θ1POSTi,t + θ2[e× POST ]i,t + λXi,t + εi,t (4)
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where LOANLENGTHi,t+1 is the average loan tenure for a stock after a short interest
announcement and prior to the next short interest announcement (including both actual and
placebo announcements). We include control variables for stock characteristics that might
be related to short-sellers’ holding periods such as stock’s market capitalization, book-to-
market ratio, idiosyncratic volatility, past cumulative monthly returns and illiquidity. We
also include year, month, day-of-week time fixed effects as well as stock fixed effects. If the
regulatory amendments hasten the speed in which information is impounded into prices,
then the holding periods of short sellers’ positions would be reduced. If this is the case, we
should then observe θ2 < 0. In Table 9, we show that in both specifications, the coefficient
on [e × POST ] is indeed negative and statistically significant. Short-sellers have a holding
period of (approximately) 80 calendar days for a typical stock, thus the estimates correspond
to an approximate 9-12% decrease in short sellers’ holding periods.
We next analyze the impact of the regulatory amendments on the reward-to-risk ratios
of short-sellers’ positions. If short-sellers’ information is impounded into prices more readily
with the regulatory amendments, then short-sellers would be able to earn returns to their
information with lower volatility. We test this prediction using the Markit database because
it allows us to observe short positions on both actual and placebo report dates, while short
interest from Compustat is what is disclosed to the public, thus it only allows us to observe
short interest only on actual report dates.
On each REPDATE (including placebo report dates), we form 10 portfolios based on
changes in short interest from the previous REPDATE. ΔSHORT_MARKIT is the
change in short interest based on Markit data between two consecutive REPDATEs, scaled
by stock’s shares outstanding at the end of the month. After forming the portfolios, we use
the daily returns until the next REPDATE and calculate the 4-factor alphas and its stan-
dard deviations for each portfolio. Table 10 reports the reward-to-risk ratios (4-factor alpha
divided by its standard deviation) to each decile portfolio in the approximately two weeks
period after REPDATE. Results indicate that, with the new reporting regime, short-sellers
earn higher reward-to-risk ratios in the days following the short interest announcement.
For instance, consider a strategy that is long on stocks with ΔSHORT_MARKIT be-
low the 10th percentile and short on stocks with ΔSHORT_MARKIT above the 90th
percentile. Portfolios formed after the end-of-month REPDATE in the post-amendment
period (POST = 1 and e = 1) have a reward-to-risk ratio of 2.5, while portfolios formed
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after the placebo end-of-month REPDATE in the pre-amendment period (POST = 0 and
e = 1) have a reward-to-risk ratio of 1.54. In line with our previous results, this difference
is mostly driven by stocks that are heavily shorted.
Finally, in addition to examining short-sellers’ holdings periods and reward-to-risk ratios,
we ask whether the amount of short-selling is also affected after the rule amendments. We
expect that after the regulatory amendments, due to declines in horizon risk, short-sellers
might be more willing to take positions. To examine this, we run the following regression:
ΔSHORT_MARKITi,t+1 = αi + κ0ei,t + κ1POSTi,t + κ2[e× POST ]i,t +ΥXi,t + εi,t (5)
∆SHORT_MARKIT is the change in short interest based on Markit data, scaled by stock’s
shares outstanding at the end of the month. It is calculated after REPDATE and before the
next REPDATE. Regressions include control variables for stock characteristics that might
be related to changes in short interest, such as stock’s market capitalization, book-to-market
ratio, idiosyncratic volatility, past cumulative monthly returns and illiquidity. If short-sellers
are more active after the regulatory amendments, this would result in larger short positions,
that is, κ2 > 0. Table 11 show results that are consistent with this hypothesis. We find that
the coefficient on [e× POST ] is positive and significant across all specifications, indicating
that there is an increase in the amount of short-selling after the regulatory amendments.
Overall, these results provide evidence corroborating the findings we previously presented.
Although the analysis in this section uses data that covers only a part of short-sales (the part
covered by Markit), the results are useful in suggesting that extra short interest disclosure
at the end of each month in the post-amendment period have important implications. The
regulatory amendments seem to reduce short-sellers’ holding periods, assist short-sellers
reduce price risks and increase short-selling activity.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the role that greater disclosure of arbitrage activity and informed
trading has on price efficiency. To answer this question, we study the shorting market and
exploit SEC approved amendments to exchange rules, which increased the frequency of public
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disclosure of short positions. Greater public disclosure can potentially have both costs and
benefits, thus the impact it has on price efficiency, a priori, is not immediately obvious. On
the one hand, greater disclosure may hurt the production of information if it reduces the
ability of arbitrageurs to profit from their information. On the other hand, disclosure can be
beneficial as it can help arbitrageurs overcome the limits to arbitrage arising from horizon
risk.
We estimate the changes to price efficiency with more frequent reporting of short interest
using an identification strategy which relies on placebo dates—dates when short interest
would have been publicly reported had broker-dealers been required to report short interest
positions at the end-of-month in the pre-amendment period. The identification strategy
allows us to identify the causal effects of higher public disclosure requirements. Our findings
indicate that the new reporting regime has an important impact on a stock’s informational
environment. Specifically, information encapsulated within short interest is more quickly
incorporated into prices, thereby increasing price informativeness. In extended analyses, we
find that greater short interest disclosure reduces short-sellers’ horizon risk and increases the
amount of short-selling.
Our work has implications on regulatory policy of short selling public disclosure, and
more broadly, public disclosure of private information. While in the E.U., regulations re-
quiring the immediate disclosure of trader-level positions have discouraged short-selling and
hampered price efficiency, our paper provides evidence that bi-monthly disclosure of ag-
gregated short positions in the U.S. can ameliorate the negative consequences associated
with higher publicity. Regulatory policies should consider both the potential costs as well
as the potential benefits of higher public disclosure requirements imposed on arbitrageurs
and informed trading. Public disclosure requirements should aim to maximize the benefits
by helping the wider investing public learn from informed traders while not distorting in-
centives for informed traders to produce private information. Designed in this way, public
disclosure requirements can help arbitrageurs overcome market frictions and therefore foster
price efficiency.
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Appendix A. Definition and Description of Variables 
 
Variable Name  Name Description Source 
REPDATE 
Disclosure date of 
Short Interest 
Announcement 
Date of mid-month and end-of-month short interest 
announcements. This also includes the placebo 
REPDATEs in the pre-amendment period. 
Compustat 
POST 
Post-Amendment 
Period 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for observations in 
the post-amendment period, that is, after September 
7, 2007, and zero otherwise. 
Compustat 
e 
Observations 
relative to Short 
Interest 
announcement date  
Dummy variable that equals 1 for observations 
after the end-of-month REPDATE and before the 
mid-month REPDATE the following month. 
Compustat  
CAR[0,1] 
Cumulative 
abnormal returns 
over announcement 
period 
Calculated two ways: (1) Absolute value of 
difference between buy-and-hold returns of the 
stock over [0,1] and beta multiplied by the buy-
and-hold return of the market over [0,1]; (2) 
Absolute value of difference between buy-and-hold 
returns of the stock over [0,1] and that of a size and 
book-to-market matched portfolio over [0,1]. beta 
used in (1) is estimated from regressing daily stock 
returns on daily market returns using [t-300,t-46] 
window where t is the date of the earnings 
announcement. 
CRSP, 
Fama-
French 
CAR[2,61] 
Cumulative 
abnormal returns 
over post-
announcement 
period 
Calculated two ways: (1) Absolute value of 
difference between buy-and-hold returns of the 
stock over [2,61] and beta multiplied by the buy-
and-hold return of the market over [2,61]; (2) 
Absolute value of difference between buy-and-hold 
returns of the stock over [2,61] and that of a size 
and book-to-market matched portfolio over [2,61]. 
beta used in (1) is estimated from regressing daily 
stock returns on daily market returns using [t-300,t-
46] window where t is the date of the earnings 
announcement. 
CRSP, 
Fama-
French 
NUMEST 
Number of 
Analysts 
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
analysts giving EPS forecasts for the given firm in 
that quarter. 
I/B/E/S 
EARNINGS_PERSIST 
Earnings 
Persistence 
First-order autocorrelation coefficient of quarterly 
EPS during the past 4 years. 
I/B/E/S, 
Compustat 
EARNINGS_VOL Earnings Volatility 
Standard deviation of quarterly EPS in the past four 
years. 
I/B/E/S, 
Compustat 
FE Forecast Error 
Absolute value of difference between the 
announced earnings and the consensus EPS 
forecast normalized by the firm’s stock price at the 
end of the corresponding quarter. The consensus 
EPS forecast is calculated as in Hirshleifer, Lim 
and Teoh (2009).  
I/B/E/S, 
Compustat, 
CRSP 
IO 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Fraction of all shares outstanding held by 
institutional investors for a given stock at the end 
of the quarter (in %). 
Thomson 
Reuters 
TURNOVER Stock Turnover 
Average daily trading volume in the [0,1] days 
around the earnings announcement divided by 
shares outstanding at the end of the month. 
CRSP 
VOLATILITY 
Stock Price 
Volatility 
Difference between the highest and the lowest 
share prices over the [0,1] days around the earnings 
announcement, normalized by the average of the 
two. 
CRSP 
SPREAD Bid-Ask Spread 
Daily (%) average bid-ask spread over the [-4,-2] 
window before the earnings announcement. 
CRSP 
NEGNEW 
Negative Earnings 
Announcement 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm's earnings 
surprise is negative. 
Compustat, 
I/B/E/S 
FeeRisk Stock Fee Risk 
Standard deviation of loan fees (for a stock) in 
previous month  
Markit 
TradingActivity Trading Activity 
A stock’s average turnover (volume divided by 
shares outstanding) in previous month 
CRSP 
DELAY1 
Price Delay 
(1st Measure) 
Using data between consecutive REPDATEs, we 
first run the following regression across all stocks: 
𝑟𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿
(−𝑛)
4
𝑛=1
𝑅𝑚,𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
 
where 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 is the stock’s return in week t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is 
the return on the CRSP value-weighted market 
index in week t. We then calculate DELAY1 
between REPDATEs as follows: 
𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌1 = 1 −
𝑅
𝛿(−𝑛)=0,∀𝑛∈[1,4] 
2
𝑅2
 
 
where 𝑅
𝛿(−𝑛)=0,∀𝑛∈[1,4] 
2 is the R2 from the regression 
above where all the coefficients on 𝛿(−𝑛) are 
restricted to zero, is divided by the R2 from the 
regression above with no restrictions.   
CRSP 
DELAY1_NEG 
Price Delay 
(2nd Measure) 
DELAY1_NEG is calculated using the same method 
as DELAY1, except we only use negative market 
returns in the estimation (positive market returns 
are set to equal zero). 
CRSP 
DELAY3 
Price Delay 
(3rd Measure) 
Coefficient estimates are first calculated using the 
regression from DELAY1. Next, we calculate 
DELAY3 between REPDATEs as follows: 
 
𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3 =
∑ 𝑛𝛿(−𝑛)/4𝑛=1 𝑠𝑒(𝛿
(−𝑛))
𝛽/𝑠𝑒(𝛽) + ∑ 𝛿(−𝑛)/4𝑛=1 𝑠𝑒(𝛿
(−𝑛))
  
 
where se(.) is the standard error of the coefficient 
estimate. 
CRSP 
VARRATIO Variance Ratio 
Calculated for each stock on each trading day as 
follows: 
 
𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 = |1 −
𝑣𝑎𝑟(30min)
30 × 𝑣𝑎𝑟(1min)
| 
 
where var(30min) is the variance of 30-minute 
returns and var(1min) is the variance of 1-minute 
returns. We then calculate the average VARRATIO 
between REPDATEs. 
TAQ 
PE 
Scaled Pricing 
Error 
Calculated for each stock on each trading day as 
follows: 
𝑃𝐸 =
𝜎(𝑠)
𝜎(𝑝)
 
where 𝜎(𝑠) is the standard deviation of the pricing 
error, which is assumed to follow a zero-mean, 
covariance-stationary process, and 𝜎(𝑝) is the 
standard deviation of intraday transaction prices. 
We then calculate the average PE between 
REPDATEs. 
TAQ 
SIZE Size 
Market capitalization of a stock measured by price 
in month t multiplied by shares outstanding in 
month t, measured in $ million 
CRSP 
BM 
Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
Book Equity in June of calendar year, t, divided by 
market equity in December of previous calendar 
year, t-1. 
CRSP, 
Compustat 
IVOL 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
Standard deviation of idiosyncratic monthly returns 
over the past 2-year window (in %), where 
idiosyncratic monthly returns are the residuals in a 
regression of a stock’s monthly return on the three 
Fama and French (1993) factors. 
CRSP, 
Fama-
French 
ILLIQ Illiquidity 
Average ratio of the absolute value of daily returns 
to the stock daily volume in the past six months, as 
in Amihud (2002). 
CRSP 
PASTRETURNS Past Returns 
Cumulative monthly returns over the past six 
months. 
CRSP 
MONTHLY 
Period before and 
after Markit started 
providing monthly 
total short interest 
data 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for the period from 
June 2002 to December 2003; and zero for the 
period from January 2001 to May 2002  
Markit 
WEEKLY 
Period before and 
after where Markit 
started providing 
weekly total short 
interest data 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for the period from 
August 2004 to June 2006; and zero for the period 
from October 2002 to July 2004 
Markit 
DAILY 
Period before and 
after where Markit 
started providing 
daily total short 
interest data 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for the period from 
July 2006 to August 2007; and zero for the period 
from May 2005 to June 2006 
Markit 
ΔSHORT 
Change in Short 
Interest 
Change in short interest between two successive 
short interest announcement dates, scaled by stock's 
shares outstanding at the end of the month (in %). 
In the pre period, it captures monthly changes; in 
the post period, it is bi-monthly changes  
CRSP, 
Compustat 
Increased Shorting 
Portfolio of stocks 
with the greatest 
increase in Short 
Interest  
Portfolio of stocks that has ΔSHORT above the 90th 
percentile at each REPDATE. 
CRSP, 
Compustat 
Decreased Shorting  
Portfolio of stocks 
with the greatest 
decrease in Short 
Interest 
Portfolio of stocks that has ΔSHORT below the 10th 
percentile at each REPDATE. 
CRSP, 
Compustat 
LOANLENGTH 
Holding Period of 
Short-Sellers’ 
Positions  
Average loan tenure for short-sale positions after 
each REPDATE and before the next REPDATE. 
Markit 
ΔSHORT_MARKIT 
Change in Short 
Interest based on 
Markit 
Change in short interest based on the universe of 
market participants covered by Markit. It is 
calculated as the difference between two 
consecutive REPDATEs (including the placebo 
REPDATEs), scaled by shares outstanding at the 
end of the month. Defined in %s.  
Markit, 
CRSP 
 
Appendix B. Explanation of TAQ Data Processing and Construction of High-
Frequency Measures of Informational Efficiency 
This appendix explains the method used to process TAQ data and construct the high-frequency measures of 
informational efficiency. We first process all trades and quotes in the TAQ database from January 1, 2003 to 
December 31, 2012, excluding 2008. We follow Hasbrouck (1993) and exclude overnight returns. We focus 
solely on trades and quotes within regular trading hours, that is, between 9:30 am and 4:00 pm Eastern Time. 
For the processing of the trade files, we follow Boehmer and Wu (2013) and remove trades with non-positive 
prices or sizes. Furthermore, we require that TAQ’s CORR file to equal zero, and TAQ’s COND field is either 
blank or equal to *, B, E, J, or K. We also follow Boehmer and Wu (2013) and remove trades with a price 
greater than 150% or less than 50% of the price of the previous trade. For the processing of the quote files, we 
remove quotes with non-positive bid or ask prices or where the bid price is strictly higher than the ask price—
that is, we remove cases of locked and crossed markets. We requite that TAQ’s mode field is equal to 1, 2, 3, 6, 
10, 12, 15, 19, 20, 27, or 28. We also follow Boehmer and Wu (2013) and require that quotes with an ask price 
that is greater than 150% of the bid price are excluded. For each stock, we aggregate all trades during the same 
second that execute at the same price, and retain only the last quote for each second, in the case that multiple 
quotes are reported. To combine the quote and trade file, we use the Lee and Ready’s (1991) method for 
assigning trade directions. That is, we denote the trade as “buyer-initiated” if the trade price is greater than the 
prevailing mid-quote, and we denote the trade as “seller-initiated” if the trade price is less than the prevailing 
mid-quote. 
To calculate the Variance Ratio, we first generate overlapping 1-minute and 30-minute returns for each stock in 
each trading day. As is customary in the market microstructure literature, we use the quote mid-point as opposed 
to the trade price in calculating returns. We then construct take the variance of all overlapping 30-minute and 1-
minute returns for each stock each trading day and compute the variance ratio as follows: 
𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 = |1 −
𝑣𝑎𝑟(30min)
30 × 𝑣𝑎𝑟(1min)
| 
To calculate the Pricing Error, we follow Hasbrouck (1993) and Boehmer and Wu (2013), and decompose log 
transaction prices, 𝑝𝑡, as follows: 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡 
In the equation above, 𝑚𝑡 represents the efficient (random walk) component of the stock price. It is the 
expectation of the stock’s fundamental value. 𝑚𝑡 changes in response to new public information. 𝑠𝑡 represents 
the pricing error, and measures temporary deviations relative to 𝑚𝑡 . It is assumed to follow a zero-mean 
covariance-stationary process, however, it can be serially correlated or correlated with the innovations from 𝑚𝑡. 
The standard deviation of the pricing error, 𝜎(𝑠) measures the magnitude of deviations from the efficient price 
and can be interpreted as a measure of informational efficiency. 
To empirically estimate this model, we follow Boehmer and Wu (2013) and run a vector autoregression (VAR) 
system for each stock each trading day, using five lags over the following jointly determined system of 
variables, {𝑟𝑡, 𝑥𝑡}, where 𝑟𝑡 is the difference in log prices, 𝑝𝑡, and 𝑥𝑡 is a vector representing trade-related 
variables such as, trade sign indicator—a variable which equals 1 for a buy and -1 for a sale, signed trading 
volume, and signed square root of trading volume. Estimating this system of equations using a VAR yields 
estimates of 𝜎(𝑠) for each stock each trading day. We scale 𝜎(𝑠) by the standard deviation of log transaction 
prices, 𝜎(𝑝), to compute the pricing error, PE. Finally, to reduce the influence of outliers, we follow Boehmer 
and Wu (2013) and remove observations where 𝜎(𝑠) > 𝜎(𝑝). 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
In this table, we present the descriptive statistics for our main analysis. We divide our sample into two sub-
samples: e = 0 pertains to observations where the firm’s earnings announcement occurs after the mid-month 
REPDATE and before the end-of-month REPDATE; and e = 1 pertains to observations where the firm’s earnings 
announcement occurs after the end-of-month REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE the following 
month. NUMEST is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts giving EPS forecasts for the given 
firm in that quarter; IO is the fraction of all shares outstanding held by institutional investors for a given stock at 
the end of the quarter (in %); FE is the difference between the announced earnings and the consensus EPS 
forecast normalized by the firm’s stock price at the end of the corresponding quarter; EARNINGS_PERSIST is 
the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of quarterly earnings per share during the past 4 years; 
EARNINGS_VOL is the standard deviation of quarterly EPS in the past 4 years; NUMANN is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of concurrent earnings announcements that occur on the same day as the 
earning’s announcement for the given stock.  
 
VARIABLES Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
     
e = 0 
NUMEST 1.5093 1.6094 0.8896 
IO 56.9318 59.9246 26.7693 
FE 0.0073 0.0023 0.0170 
EARNINGS_PERSIST 0.2489 0.2370 0.3044 
EARNINGS_VOL 0.4646 0.2229 0.8796 
NUMANN 4.0884 4.2047 0.8442 
 
    
e = 1 
NUMEST 1.5143 1.6094 0.8181 
IO 60.5778 63.7538 25.2301 
FE 0.0074 0.0027 0.0162 
EARNINGS_PERSIST 0.2449 0.2252 0.2971 
EARNINGS_VOL 0.4951 0.2469 0.9265 
NUMANN 4.6722 4.8978 0.8584 
     
Table 2. Short-Term Price Reactions to Earnings Announcements 
In this table, we present the regression results for the short-term price reactions to earnings announcements. In 
Panel A, we present the regression results where the dependent variable, CAR[0,1] is the absolute value of 2-day 
cumulative abnormal return in the [0,1] days around the earnings announcement, defined as the difference 
between buy-and-hold returns of the stock and beta multiplied by the buy-and-hold return of the market. In 
Panel B, we present the regression results where the dependent variable, CAR[0,1] is the absolute value of 2-day 
cumulative abnormal return in the [0,1] days around the earnings announcement, defined as the difference 
between buy-and-hold returns of the stock and that of a size and book-to-market matched portfolio. The 
explanatory variables include: POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the firm’s earnings announcement 
dates after September 7, 2007; e is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm’s earnings announcement 
occurs after the end-of-month REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE the following month; POST x e 
is an interaction term between POST and e. In columns 2 to 4, we control for NUMEST, IO, FE, 
EARNINGS_PERSIST, EARNINGS_VOL, NUMANN (which are defined in Table 1 and Appendix A), and 
include industry, year, month and day-of-week fixed effects. In column 4, we also include stock fixed effects. 
All regressions include a constant term, whose coefficient is suppressed for reporting purposes. We present 
ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors double-clustered by stock and earnings announcement day; 
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Short-Term Price Reactions: 2 Days, Beta-Adjusted Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] 
     
POST x e -0.0030*** -0.0025*** -0.0023** -0.0021*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0007) 
POST 0.0124*** 0.0121*** 0.0122*** 0.0120*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0014) 
e 0.0032*** 0.0027*** 0.0034*** 0.0028*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0005) 
NUMEST  -0.0051*** -0.0051*** -0.0016*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
IO  0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000* 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
FE  0.1565*** 0.1564*** 0.0973*** 
  (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0132) 
EARNINGS_PERSIST  0.0031*** 0.0032*** 0.0033*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
EARNINGS_VOL  0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0016*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
NUMANN   -0.0015*** -0.0017*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0003) 
     
Observations 78,317 59,020 59,020 59,020 
R-squared 0.071 0.121 0.121 0.063 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Stock FE No No No Yes 
     
  
Panel B. Short-Term Price Reactions: 2 Days, SMB-Adjusted Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] 
     
POST x e -0.0028*** -0.0021** -0.0019** -0.0017** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0007) 
POST 0.0125*** 0.0120*** 0.0121*** 0.0119*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0013) 
e 0.0032*** 0.0027*** 0.0034*** 0.0027*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0005) 
NUMEST  -0.0050*** -0.0050*** -0.0015*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
IO  0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
FE  0.1581*** 0.1580*** 0.1003*** 
  (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0129) 
EARNINGS_PERSIST  0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0034*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
EARNINGS_VOL  0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0017*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
NUMANN   -0.0015*** -0.0017*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0003) 
     
Observations 78,327 59,026 59,026 59,026 
R-squared 0.071 0.119 0.119 0.062 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Stock FE No No No Yes 
     
 
 
  
Table 3. Other Short-Term Effects Around Earnings Announcements 
In this table, we present the regression results for the other effects measures around earning announcements. The 
dependent variables are: in column (1) TURNOVER is average daily volume over the [0,1] days around the 
earnings announcement divided by shares outstanding at the end of the month; in column (2) VOLATILITY is 
difference between the highest and lowest share prices over the [0,1] days around the earnings announcement, 
normalized by an average of the two; in column (3) SPREAD is the daily average bid-ask spread over the [-4,-2] 
days before the earnings announcement. The explanatory variables include: POST is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for the firm’s earnings announcement dates after September 7, 2007; e is a dummy variable that equals 
1 when the firm’s earnings announcement occurs after the end-of-month REPDATE and before the mid-month 
REPDATE the following month; POST x e is an interaction term between POST and e. All regressions include 
the following control variables: NUMEST, IO, FE, EARNINGS_PERSIST, EARNINGS_VOL, NUMANN, and 
industry, stock, year, month and day-of-week fixed effects. Controls variables are defined in Table 1 and 
Appendix A. We also include a constant term in all regression specifications, but suppress it for reporting 
purposes. We present ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors double-clustered by stock and 
earnings announcement day; *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES TURNOVER VOLATILITY SPREAD 
    
POST x e -0.0011*** -0.0209*** -0.0126** 
 (0.0003) (0.0066) (0.0057) 
POST 0.0010* 0.0077* 0.1061*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0045) (0.0097) 
e 0.0009*** 0.0149*** 0.0079* 
 (0.0002) (0.0048) (0.0044) 
    
Observations 59,934 59,425 59,904 
R-squared 0.082 0.022 0.132 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
    
    
Table 4. Long-Term Price Reactions to Earnings Announcements 
In this table, we present the regression results for the long-term price reactions to earnings announcements. In 
Panel A, we presents the regression results where the dependent variable, CAR[2,61] is the absolute value of 60-
day cumulative abnormal returns in the [2,61] days after the earnings announcement, defined as the difference 
between buy-and-hold returns of the stock and beta multiplied by the buy-and-hold return of the market. In 
Panel B, we present the regression results where the dependent variable, CAR[2,61] is the absolute value of 60-
day cumulative abnormal return in the [2,61] days after the earnings announcement, defined as the difference 
between buy-and-hold returns of the stock and that of a size and book-to-market matched portfolio. The 
explanatory variables include: POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the firm’s earnings announcement 
dates after September 7, 2007; e is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm’s earnings announcement 
occurs after the end-of-month REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE the following month; POST x e 
is an interaction term between POST and e. In columns 2 to 4, we control for NUMEST, IO, FE, 
EARNINGS_PERSIST, EARNINGS_VOL, NUMANN (which are defined in Table 1 and Appendix A), and 
include industry, year, month and day-of-week fixed effects. In column 4, we also include stock fixed effects. 
All regression specifications include a constant term, whose coefficient is suppressed for reporting purposes. We 
present ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors double-clustered by stock and earnings 
announcement day; *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
 
Panel A. Long-Term Price Reactions: 60 Days, Beta-Adjusted Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] 
     
POST x e -0.0066** -0.0083*** -0.0080*** -0.0075*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) 
POST 0.0309*** 0.0269*** 0.0270*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0041) 
e 0.0016 0.0042** 0.0050*** 0.0053*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
NUMEST  -0.0166*** -0.0166*** -0.0058*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0020) 
IO  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
FE   0.8893*** 0.8892*** 0.5217*** 
  (0.0606) (0.0606) (0.0631) 
EARNINGS_PERSIST  0.0071*** 0.0072*** 0.0085*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0030) 
EARNINGS_VOL  0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0035** 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0015) 
NUMANN   -0.0017 -0.0061*** 
   (0.0010) (0.0013) 
     
Observations 74,733 56,609 56,609 56,609 
R-squared 0.024 0.073 0.073 0.028 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Stock FE No No No Yes 
     
 
  
Panel B. Long-Term Price Reactions: 60 Days, SMB-Adjusted Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] 
     
POST x e -0.0063** -0.0075*** -0.0071*** -0.0060** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0026) 
POST 0.0274*** 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0228*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0040) 
e 0.0001 0.0031* 0.0041** 0.0040** 
 (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
NUMEST  -0.0147*** -0.0147*** -0.0045** 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0019) 
IO  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
FE   0.8092*** 0.8091*** 0.4439*** 
  (0.0563) (0.0563) (0.0581) 
EARNINGS_PERSIST  0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0084*** 
  (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0029) 
EARNINGS_VOL  0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0032** 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014) 
NUMANN   -0.0021** -0.0068*** 
   (0.0009) (0.0012) 
     
Observations 74,734 56,609 56,609 56,609 
R-squared 0.027 0.073 0.073 0.031 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Stock FE No No No Yes 
     
 
Table 5. Cross-Sectional Differences   
In this table, we present the cross-sectional differences in the regression results reported in Table 2. In Column 
1, we introduce interaction terms with High FeeRisk, which is a dummy equals to 1 when the firm’s FeeRisk is 
above median; in Column 2, we introduce interaction terms with High IVOL, which is a dummy equals to 1 
when the firm’s idiosyncratic volatility is above median; in Column 3, we introduce interaction terms with High 
RetailTrading, which is a dummy equals to 1 when the firm’s IO is below median and its TradingActivity above 
median; in Column 4, we introduce interaction terms with Low ILLIQ, which is a dummy equals to 1 when the 
firm’s Amihud ILLIQ is above median; in Column 5, we introduce interaction terms with NegNew, if the firm's 
earnings announcement is negative. Definitions of FeeRisk, IVOL, IO, TradingActivity, ILLIQ are in Appendix 
A. Dependent variable is CAR[0,1], which is the absolute value of 2-day cumulative abnormal return in the [0,1] 
days around the earnings announcement, defined as the difference between buy-and-hold returns of the stock 
and beta multiplied by the buy-and-hold return of the market. POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the 
firm’s earnings announcement dates after September 7, 2007; e is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the 
firm’s earnings announcement occurs after the end-of-month REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE 
the following month.  The explanatory variables include all interaction terms between POST, e and Char, which 
refers to the stock characteristics explained above. All regressions include the following control variables: 
NUMEST, IO, FE, EARNINGS_PERSIST, EARNINGS_VOL, NUMANN, and industry, year, month and day-of-
week fixed effects. We also include a constant term in all regression specifications, but suppress it for reporting 
purposes. We present ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors double-clustered by stock and 
earnings announcement day; *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES High FeeRisk High IVOL High RetailTrading Low ILLIQ NegNew 
      
      
POST x e -0.0015* -0.0012* -0.0018* -0.0029*** -0.0014* 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
POST x e x Char -0.0010** -0.0007* -0.0014** 0.0033** -0.0021** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0010) 
e x Char 0.0007* 0.0001 0.0013* -0.0015 0.0014** 
 (0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0007) 
POST x Char 0.0016 -0.0045** -0.0026 -0.0020 0.0022** 
 (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0011) 
Char 0.0029** 0.0175*** 0.0100*** -0.0002 0.0012* 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0007) 
POST 0.0083*** 0.0127*** 0.0115*** 0.0126*** 0.0116*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
e 0.0026*** 0.0030*** 0.0029*** 0.0037*** 0.0031*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
      
Observations 42,294 56,255 59,019 58,671 59,020 
R-squared 0.135 0.143 0.125 0.122 0.122 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
  
Table 6. Alternative Measures of Informational Efficiency: Price Delay 
In this table, we present the regression results from Equation (1) using alternative measures of informational 
efficiency which rely on the price delay measure of Hou and Moskowitz (2005). Specifically, we use the 
following dependent variables: in column (1), DELAY1 is a measure similar to Hou and Moskowitz’s (2005) D1 
measures of price delay, measured as one minus the ratio of the R2 from the regression where coefficients on 
lagged market returns are constrained to zero and the unrestricted R2; in column (2), DELAY1_NEG is a measure 
similar to DELAY1, except that only negative market returns are used (positive market returns are set to equal 
zero); in column (3), DELAY3 is a measure similar to Hou and Moskowitz’s (2005) D3 measure of price delay, 
which distinguishes between shorter and longer lags of market returns and accounts for the precision of 
estimates on the coefficients of lagged market returns. DELAY1, DELAY1_NEG, and DELAY3 are calculated as 
cross-sectional averages between consecutive REPDATEs, therefore there is a single price delay measure 
corresponding to each REPDATE. Further details regarding the calculation of DELAY1, DELAY1_NEG, and 
DELAY3 can be found in Appendix A. The explanatory variables include: POST is a dummy variable that equals 
1 for observations in the post-amendment period; e is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the delay measures 
are calculated after the end-of-month REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE the following month; 
POST x e is an interaction term between POST and e. All regressions include year, month and day-of-week 
fixed effects and a constant term whose coefficient is suppressed for reporting purposes. *, **, *** indicate 
10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES DELAY1 DELAY1_NEG DELAY3 
    
POST -0.0346 -0.0094 -0.4632 
 (0.0211) (0.0611) (0.2949) 
e 0.0300* 0.1535*** 0.4747** 
 (0.0177) (0.0338) (0.1861) 
POST x e -0.0470** -0.1666*** -0.5361** 
 (0.0206) (0.0484) (0.2208) 
    
Observations 216 216 216 
R-squared 0.225 0.200 0.259 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
 
 
Table 7. Alternative Measures of Informational Efficiency: High Frequency Measures 
In this table, we use high-frequency measures of informational efficiency measured as the average between the 
current REPDATE and the following REPDATE: in columns (1) and (2), VARRATIO is the variance ratio of 1-
minute and 30-minute overlapping intraday returns; in columns (3) and (4), PE is the scaled pricing error 
defined as the standard deviation of the pricing error divided by the standard deviation of log intraday prices. 
Further details regarding the calculation of VARRATIO and PE can be found in Appendix A and B. The 
explanatory variables include: POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations in the post-amendment 
period; e is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the high frequency measures are calculated after the end-of-
month REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE the following month; POST x e is an interaction term 
between POST and e. In addition to POST, e, and POST x e, we include the control variables of: idiosyncratic 
volatility (IVOL), stock’s market capitalization (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), past cumulative monthly 
returns (PASTRETURNS) and illiquidity (ILLIQ). Further details regarding the definition of these variables can 
be in Appendix A. All regressions include industry, stock, year, month and day-of-week fixed effects. We also 
include a constant term in all regression specifications, but suppress it for reporting purposes. We present 
ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors clustered by stock and short-interest announcement days; *, 
**, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES VARRATIO VARRATIO PE PE 
     
POST x e -0.0236*** -0.0206*** -0.0039*** -0.0041*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
e 0.0199*** 0.0173*** 0.0045*** 0.0033*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
POST 0.0418*** 0.0456*** 0.0007 0.0061*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
IVOL  -0.0020***  0.0037*** 
  (0.0001)  (0.0000) 
BM  0.0541***  0.0290*** 
  (0.0011)  (0.0004) 
SIZE  -0.0000***  -0.0000*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
ILLIQ  0.0097***  0.0066*** 
  (0.0004)  (0.0016) 
PASTRETURNS  -0.0054***  -0.0142*** 
  (0.0013)  (0.0005) 
     
Observations 533,604 419,321 451,621 357,784 
R-squared 0.016 0.076 0.050 0.242 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
 
 
Table 8. Market Reactions to Short Interest Announcements  
In this table, we present the results from the market reactions to short interest announcements during our sample 
period. We form 10 portfolios based on changes to short interest (ΔSHORT) on each announcement date, 
ΔSHORT is the change in short interest between two successive short interest announcements, scaled by shares 
outstanding at the end of the month. The bottom decile portfolio (Decile 1) has a ΔSHORT below the 10th 
percentile, and the top decile portfolio (Decile 10) has a ΔSHORT above the 90th percentile. In Panel A, we 
report the average 2-day return (in %) in the [1,2] days after the short interest announcement. We skip the day of 
announcement because short interest is disclosed after 4:00 p.m. In column 1, we report size and book-to-market 
adjusted abnormal returns; in columns 2 and 3, we present 3-factor and 4-factor alphas respectively. In Panel B, 
we report the average 4-factor alphas in the [1,2] days after the short interest announcement, in the pre- and 
post-amendment periods. In Panel C, we report the average 4-factor alphas in the [-3,0] days prior to the short 
interest announcement. We use Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags (reported in parentheses). *, **, *** 
indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
Panel A. Announcement Day Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Decile SMB  3-factor Alpha 4-factor Alpha 
1 0.0432*** 0.0479*** 0.0477*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0124) (0.0125) 
10 -0.1060*** -0.1008*** -0.1031*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0160) (0.0155) 
   
 
Diff -0.1492*** -0.1487*** -0.1508*** 
 
(0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0166) 
 
Panel B. Announcement Day Returns: pre- vs post-amendment periods  
Decile POST=0 POST=1 Diff 
1 0.0171 0.0534*** 0.0363** 
 
(0.0201) (0.0157) (0.0179) 
10 -0.0654** -0.1275*** -0.0621*** 
 
(0.0286) (0.0178) (0.0218) 
 
   
Diff 0.0825*** 0.1809*** 0.0984*** 
 
(0.0277) (0.0185) (0.0302) 
 
Panel C. Pre-Announcement Returns  
Decile t = 0 t = -1 t = -2 t = -3 
1 -0.0021 -0.0151 -0.0035 -0.0263 
 (0.0227) (0.0211) (0.0165) (0.0247) 
10 -0.0056 0.0345 -0.0201 0.0060 
 
(0.0225) (0.0261) (0.0189) (0.0204) 
    
 
Diff -0.0036 0.0497* -0.0167 0.0323 
 
(0.0222) (0.0256) (0.0185) (0.0264) 
Table 9. Short Sellers’ Holding Periods 
In this table, we present the regression results of the impact of the regulatory amendments have on short sellers’ 
holding periods. The table presents the regression results where the dependent variable, LOANLENGTH is the 
average loan tenure (in calendar days) for short-sale positions after the current REPDATE and before the next 
REPDATE. The explanatory variables include: POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations in the 
post-amendment period; e is a dummy variable that equals 1 when LOANLENGTH is calculated after the end-of-
month REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE the following month; POST x e is an interaction term 
between POST and e. In column 2, we include the following control variables: idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), 
stock’s market capitalization (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), past cumulative monthly returns 
(PASTRETURNS), illiquidity (ILLIQ) and stock fixed effects. Further details regarding the definition of control 
variables can be found in Appendix A. All regressions include year, month, day-of-week fixed effects. We also 
include a constant term in all regression specifications, but suppress it for reporting purposes. We present 
ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors double-clustered by stock and short-interest announcement 
days; *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES LOANLENGTH LOANLENGTH 
   
POST x e -9.8280*** -9.0411*** 
 (2.9838) (3.2552) 
POST 3.2377*** 2.1909** 
 (0.7576) (0.8690) 
e 9.6129*** 8.7815*** 
 (2.9862) (3.2575) 
SIZE  -0.0012*** 
  (0.0002) 
IVOL  -0.5024*** 
  (0.0843) 
ILLIQ  -0.0275 
  (0.0358) 
BM  4.6395*** 
  (0.6222) 
PASTRETURNS  1.0262 
  (0.7028) 
   
Observations 382,612 306,198 
R-squared 0.028 0.039 
Controls No Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
Stock FE Yes Yes 
   
Table 10.  Reward-to-Risk Ratios of Short Sellers’ Positions  
In this table, we present the impact of the regulatory amendments on the reward-to-risk ratio of short-sellers’ 
positions. Markit reports the total short positions taken on by the universe of market participants it covers 
(SHORT_MARKIT). On each REPDATE, we form 10 portfolios based on changes in short interest in Markit 
(ΔSHORT_MARKIT). ΔSHORT_MARKIT is the change in short interest between two consecutive REPDATEs 
(including the placebo REPDATE), scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the month. The bottom decile 
portfolio (P1) has a ΔSHORT below the 10th percentile, and the top decile portfolio (P10) has a ΔSHORT above 
the 90th percentile; P1-P10 is the difference between the two portfolios. After forming the portfolios, we use the 
daily returns until the next REPDATE and calculate the average 4-factor alphas and its standard deviations for 
each portfolio. The table reports the reward-to-risk ratio, defined as the 4-factor alpha divided by its standard 
deviation. POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations in the post-amendment period; e is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 when ΔSHORT_MARKIT is calculated after the end-of-month REPDATE and before the 
mid-month REPDATE the following month.  
 
 
 
e=0   e=1 
POST=0 P1 1.1857 
 
P1 1.2400 
  
       P10 -1.9921 
 
P10 -1.6000 
  
       P1-P10 1.8453 
 
P1-P10 1.5370 
  
       
     POST=1 P1 1.2361 
 
P1 1.2051 
  
       P10 -2.0381 
 
P10 -2.4476 
  
       P1-P10 2.0897 
 
P1-P10 2.4894 
            
  
Table 11.  Amount of Short Selling  
In this table, we present the impact of the regulatory amendments on the amount of short-selling. The dependent 
variable used is ΔSHORT_MARKIT, which is the % change in total short positions reported by Markit between 
two consecutive REPDATEs (including the placebo REPDATE), scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the 
month. The explanatory variables include: POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations in the post-
amendment period; e is a dummy variable that equals 1 when ΔSHORT_MARKIT is calculated after the end-of-
month REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE the following month; POST x e is an interaction term 
between POST and e. In column 2, we include the following control variables: idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), 
stock’s market capitalization (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), past cumulative monthly returns 
(PASTRETURNS), illiquidity (ILLIQ) and stock fixed effects. Further details regarding the definition of control 
variables can be found in Appendix A. All regressions include year, month and day-of-week fixed effects. We 
also include a constant term in all regression specifications, but suppress it for reporting purposes. We present 
ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors double-clustered by stock and short-interest announcement 
days; *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ΔSHORT_MARKIT ΔSHORT_MARKIT 
   
POST x e 0.1582*** 0.1632*** 
 (0.0427) (0.0482) 
POST -0.1205 -0.1271 
 (0.0734) (0.0826) 
e -0.1244*** -0.1282*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0448) 
SIZE  -0.0000*** 
  (0.0000) 
IVOL  -0.0006 
  (0.0007) 
ILLIQ  0.0006*** 
  (0.0002) 
BM  -0.0193*** 
  (0.0054) 
PASTRETURNS  0.0035 
  (0.0137) 
   
Observations 345,458 261,958 
R-squared 0.008 0.009 
Controls No Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
Stock FE Yes Yes 
   
Figure 1. Diagrammatic Explanation of Empirical Methodology 
 
  
The identification in our empirical design comes from the additional end-of-month short 
interest announcement in the post amendment period (red square). We look at differences 
between the end-of-month and placebo end-of-month short interest announcements in the 
pre-amendment period (red dashed square). There is no change in reporting regime for mid-
month short interest announcements in pre- and post-amendment period. As such, e = 0 
when the firm’s earnings announcement occurs between the mid-month REPDATE and the 
end-of-month REPDATE, and e = 1 occurs when the firm’s earnings announcement occurs 
between the end-of-month REPDATE and mid-month REPDATE the following month.  
Post-Amendment Period 
“Placebo” End-of-Month 
REPDATE (month t)  
Mid-Month REPDATE 
(month t) 
Pre-Amendment Period 
Mid-Month REPDATE 
(month t+1) 
Mid-Month REPDATE 
(month t) 
End-of-Month REPDATE 
(month t)  
Mid-Month REPDATE 
(month t+1) 
e = 0  
e = 0  
e = 1  
e = 1  
Figure 2. Market Reactions to Short Interest Announcements in the Full Sample 
In this figure, we present the price reactions to short interest announcements. On each announcement date, we 
form 10 portfolios based on ΔSHORT, which is the change in short interest between two successive short 
interest announcements, scaled by stock's shares outstanding at the end of the month. The bottom decile 
(Decreased Shorting) portfolio has a ΔSHORT below the 10th percentile, and the top decile portfolio (Increased 
Shorting) has ΔSHORT above 90th percentile. In this figure, we show the cumulative 4-factor alphas (in %), 
starting from 7 trading days prior to the short-interest announcements until 10 trading days after the short-
interest announcements. Short interest is publicly disclosed after 4:00 p.m. at t = 0.  
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Figure 3. Market Reactions to Short Interest Announcements: Long-run Effects  
In this figure, we present the long-run price reactions to short interest announcements. On each announcement 
date, we form 10 portfolios based on ΔSHORT, which is the change in short interest between two successive 
short interest announcements, scaled by stock's shares outstanding at the end of the month. This figure shows the 
cumulative 4-factor alphas (in %), starting from 7 trading days prior to the short-interest announcements until 60 
trading days after the short-interest announcements. Short interest is publicly disclosed after 4:00 p.m. at t = 0. 
The blue line shows cumulative 4-factor alphas for the Increased Shorting portfolio in the full sample. The grey 
and red lines show the cumulative 4-factor alphas for Increased Shorting portfolio within Small (stocks with 
market capitalization in bottom quintile) and LowBM (stocks with book-to-market ratios in bottom quintile), 
respectively.     
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Internet Appendix Table IA.1. Robustness: Alternative Sample Periods  
 
In this table, we present the regression results reported in Tables 2-4 using alternative sample periods. In Panel 
A, we present the regression results using a [-48,48] month event window around the regulatory amendments on 
September 7, 2007, excluding 2008. In Panel B, we present the regression results using a [-48,60] month event 
window around the regulatory amendments on September 7, 2007, excluding 2008. In both panels, we use the 
following dependent variables: in column (1) CAR[0,1] is the absolute value of 2-day cumulative abnormal 
return in the [0,1] days around the earnings announcement, defined as the difference between buy-and-hold 
returns of the stock and beta multiplied by the buy-and-hold return of the market; in column (2) TURNOVER is 
average daily volume over the [0,1] days around the earnings announcement divided by shares outstanding at 
the end of the month; in column (3) SPREAD is the daily average bid-ask spread over the pre-event time 
window [-4,-2]; in column (4) VOLATILITY is difference between the highest and lowest share prices over the 
event time window [0,1], normalized by an average of the two; in column (5) CAR[2,61] is the absolute value of 
60-day cumulative abnormal return in the [2,61] days after the earnings announcement, defined as the difference 
between buy-and-hold returns of the stock and beta multiplied by the buy-and-hold return of the market. The 
explanatory variables include: POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the firm’s earnings announcement 
dates after September 7, 2007; e is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm’s earnings announcement 
occurs after the end-of-month REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE the following month; POST x e 
is an interaction term between POST and e. All regressions include the following control variables: NUMEST, 
IO, FE, EARNINGS_PERSIST, EARNINGS_VOL, NUMANN, and industry, stock, year, month and day-of-week 
fixed effects. Controls variables are defined in Table 1 and Appendix A. We also include a constant term in all 
regression specifications, but suppress it for reporting purposes. We present ordinary least squares estimates 
with standard errors double-clustered by stock and earnings announcement day; *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% 
and 1% level of significance respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. [-48,48] Month Event Window Around the Regulatory Amendments (Excluding 2008) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CAR[0,1] TURNOVER SPREAD VOLATILITY CAR[2,61] 
      
POST x e -0.0027*** -0.0012*** -0.0139** -0.0193*** -0.0078*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0057) (0.0073) (0.0029) 
POST 0.0125*** 0.0011** 0.0887*** -0.0132 0.0264*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0096) (0.0119) (0.0042) 
e 0.0030*** 0.0009*** 0.0097** 0.0122** 0.0061*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0018) 
      
Observations 47,687 48,436 48,425 48,055 46,747 
R-squared 0.063 0.076 0.070 0.022 0.023 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. [-48,60] Month Event Window Around the Regulatory Amendments (Excluding 2008) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CAR[0,1] TURNOVER SPREAD VOLATILITY CAR[2,61] 
      
POST x e -0.0023*** -0.0012*** -0.0108* -0.0221*** -0.0062** 
 (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0029) 
POST 0.0120*** 0.0008 0.1233*** -0.0121 0.0282*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0100) (0.0116) (0.0042) 
e 0.0024*** 0.0008*** 0.0034 0.0152*** 0.0036* 
 (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0019) 
      
Observations 54,912 55,814 55,778 55,423 53,973 
R-squared 0.061 0.083 0.190 0.019 0.030 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
 
 
Internet Appendix Table IA.2. Robustness: The Timing of Earnings News 
 
In this table, we present the regression results reported in Tables 2-4 for a subsample of firms, which tend to 
announce their earnings in the same time window relative to the short interest announcement (either e = 0 or e = 
1 at each REPDATE) in both the pre- and post-amendment periods. The dependent variables are: in column (1) 
CAR[0,1] is the absolute value of 2-day cumulative abnormal return in the [0,1] days around the earnings 
announcement, defined as the difference between buy-and-hold returns of the stock and beta multiplied by the 
buy-and-hold return of the market; in column (2) TURNOVER is average daily volume over the [0,1] days 
around the earnings announcement divided by shares outstanding at the end of the month; in column (3) 
SPREAD is the daily average bid-ask spread over the pre-event time window [-4,-2]; in column (4) 
VOLATILITY is difference between the highest and lowest share prices over the event time window [0,1], 
normalized by an average of the two; in column (5) CAR[2,61] is the absolute value of 60-day cumulative 
abnormal return in the [2,61] days after the earnings announcement, defined as the difference between buy-and-
hold returns of the stock and beta multiplied by the buy-and-hold return of the market. The explanatory variables 
include: POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the firm’s earnings announcement dates after September 7, 
2007; e is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm’s earnings announcement occurs after the end-of-month 
REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE the following month; POST x e is an interaction term between 
POST and e. All regressions include the following control variables: NUMEST, IO, FE, EARNINGS_PERSIST, 
EARNINGS_VOL, NUMANN, and industry, stock, year, month and day-of-week fixed effects. Controls variables 
are defined in Table 1 and Appendix A. We also include a constant term in all regression specifications, but 
suppress it for reporting purposes. We present ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors double-
clustered by stock and earnings announcement day; *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CAR[0,1] TURNOVER SPREAD VOLATILITY CAR[2,61] 
      
POST x e -0.0027*** -0.0009*** -0.0136** -0.0314*** -0.0082*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0069) (0.0081) (0.0030) 
POST 0.0135*** 0.0014** 0.0928*** 0.0026 0.0286*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0115) (0.0140) (0.0051) 
e 0.0033*** 0.0008*** 0.0097* 0.0219*** 0.0033 
 (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0023) 
      
Observations 39,171 39,734 39,710 39,362 37,519 
R-squared 0.064 0.086 0.144 0.024 0.033 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Internet Appendix Table IA.3. Changes in the Frequency of Markit Data Availability 
 
In this table, we present the regression results analyzing the impact of changes in the frequency in availability of 
Markit data. All the changes in the frequency of availability of Markit data all occurred in the pre-amendment 
period. The dependent variables in columns (1), (3), and (5) are CAR[0,1], which is the absolute value of 2-day 
cumulative abnormal return in the [0,1] days around the earnings announcement, defined as the difference 
between buy-and-hold returns of the stock and beta multiplied by the buy-and-hold return of the market. The 
dependent in columns (2), (4), and (6) are CAR[2,61], which is the absolute value of 60-day cumulative 
abnormal return in the [2,61] days after the earnings announcement, defined as the difference between buy-and-
hold returns of the stock and beta multiplied by the buy-and-hold return of the market. Regressions use three 
experiments. First one occurred in June 2002, where Markit first started providing monthly data; second one is 
on August 2004, when reporting frequency of Markit data increased from monthly to weekly; and the third one 
is on July 2006, when the reporting frequency increased from weekly to daily. The explanatory variables 
include: MONTHLY is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the period after the first experiment and before the 
second experiment; WEEKLY is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the period after the second experiment and 
before the third experiment; and DAILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the period after the third 
experiment and before the SEC’s rule amendment implemented in September 2007. Each regression uses an 
estimation window that is symmetric around the experiment date and ensures no overlapping observations with 
the consecutive experiment. More detailed definitions of these variables are in Appendix A. All regressions 
include the following control variables: NUMEST, IO, FE, EARNINGS_PERSIST, EARNINGS_VOL, NUMANN, 
and industry, stock, year, month and day-of-week fixed effects. Controls variables are defined in Table 1 and 
Appendix A. We also include a constant term in all regression specifications, but suppress it for reporting 
purposes. We present ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors double-clustered by stock and 
earnings announcement day; *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES CAR[0,1] CAR[2,61] CAR[0,1] CAR[2,61] CAR[0,1] CAR[2,61] 
       
MONTHLY 0.0013 -0.0087**     
 (0.0009) (0.0044)     
WEEKLY   0.0001 0.0013   
   (0.0014) (0.0051)   
DAILY     -0.0021 0.0043 
     (0.0016) (0.0068) 
       
Observations 20,761 20,800 27,931 27,505 15,476 15,144 
R-squared 0.066 0.079 0.105 0.083 0.111 0.051 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
 
 
Internet Appendix Table IA.4. Robustness: Reg SH0 
 
In this table, we present the robustness of regression results reported in Tables 2-4 to “Reg SHO” regulations. 
Regulation SHO is a regulation implemented on January 3, 2005 which removed the uptick rule for a pilot group 
of stocks. On July 6, 2007, the SEC implemented the rule for the remaining stocks that had not been included in 
the original Reg SHO pilot. We reproduce our results excluding the periods 2003 and 2004 as well as the stocks 
which experienced a change in the uptick test rule on July 2007. We use the following dependent variables: in 
column (1) CAR[0,1] is the absolute value of 2-day cumulative abnormal return in the [0,1] days around the 
earnings announcement, defined as the difference between buy-and-hold returns of the stock and beta multiplied 
by the buy-and-hold return of the market; in column (2) TURNOVER is average daily volume over the [0,1] 
days around the earnings announcement divided by shares outstanding at the end of the month; in column (3) 
SPREAD is the daily average bid-ask spread over the pre-event time window [-4,-2]; in column (4) 
VOLATILITY is difference between the highest and lowest share prices over the event time window [0,1], 
normalized by an average of the two; in column (5) CAR[2,61] is the absolute value of 60-day cumulative 
abnormal return in the [2,61] days after the earnings announcement, defined as the difference between buy-and-
hold returns of the stock and beta multiplied by the buy-and-hold return of the market. The explanatory variables 
include: POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the firm’s earnings announcement dates after September 7, 
2007; e is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm’s earnings announcement occurs after the end-of-month 
REPDATE and before the mid-month REPDATE the following month; POST x e is an interaction term between 
POST and e. All regressions include the following control variables: NUMEST, IO, FE, EARNINGS_PERSIST, 
EARNINGS_VOL, NUMANN, and industry, stock, year, month and day-of-week fixed effects. Controls variables 
are defined in Table 1 and Appendix A. We also include a constant term in all regression specifications, but 
suppress it for reporting purposes. We present ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors double-
clustered by stock and earnings announcement day; *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance 
respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CAR[0,1] TURNOVER SPREAD VOLATILITY CAR[2,61] 
      
POST x e -0.0025** -0.0009** -0.0120 -0.0179* -0.0057** 
 (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0088) (0.0099) (0.0026) 
POST 0.0119*** 0.0017** 0.0854*** -0.0139 0.0190*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0055) 
e 0.0026*** 0.0011*** -0.0002 0.0118 0.0027 
 (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0073) (0.0082) (0.0028) 
      
Observations 27,793 28,265 28,265 27,963 26,486 
R-squared 0.057 0.076 0.066 0.022 0.024 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
